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Abstract
The significance of resilient communication networks in the modern society
is well established. Resilience and survivability mechanisms in current net-
works are limited and domain specific. Subsequently, the evaluation methods
are either qualitative assessments or context-specific metrics. There is a need
for rigorous quantitative evaluation of network resilience. We propose a ser-
vice oriented framework to characterize resilience of networks to a number
of faults and challenges at any abstraction level. This dissertation presents
methods to quantify the operational state and the expected service of a net-
work using functional metrics. We formalize resilience as transitions of the
network state in a two-dimensional state space quantifying network opera-
tional characteristics and service parameters. One dimension represents the
network as normally operating, partially degraded, or severely degraded. The
other dimension represents network service as acceptable, impaired, or un-
acceptable. Our goal is to initially understand how to characterize network
resilience, and ultimately how to guide network design and engineering to-
ward increased resilience. We apply the proposed framework to evaluate the
resilience of three ISP backbone network topologies and the topologies gener-
ated using a new realistic topology generator. Furthermore, we quantify the
resilience of MANETs at multiple layer boundaries. We develop new predic-
tive routing algorithms for weather disruption-tolerant networks, which are
shown to be more resilient than the existing protocols. Lastly, we develop a
new routing algorithm for highly-mobile ad hoc airborne networking.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
Society increasingly relies on computer networks as essential for individuals,
businesses, and governments. These networks include the Global Internet,
PSTN (public switched telephone network – wired and mobile), SCADA net-
works (supervisory control and data acquisition), and emerging sensor and
mobile ad hoc networks. They have developed into large scale systems with
increasing complexity both in terms of physical infrastructure as well as the
operational protocols and user applications. Essential services are provided
by distributed networked systems in the sectors of energy, finance, banking,
education, health care, defense, transport, and communication. More re-
cently, personal communication and sensor networks have exploded in to the
mainstream market. A number of new services have emerged that depend
on the dependability of these wireless networks.
The consequences of disruption to either legacy or emerging networks are
thus increasingly severe, and threaten the lives of individuals, the financial
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health of business and other organizations, as well as the economic stabil-
ity and security of nations and the world. Canonical examples include the
dependence of military operations on the Global Information Grid [3] and
interdependency of the Internet and the electrical grid for power [4]. With
this increasing importance of, and reliance on the networks, so follows their
increasing attractiveness as a target from bad guys: recreational and pro-
fessional crackers, terrorists, and from information warfare. The U.S com-
mission on critical infrastructure concluded that network attacks have the
potential to be catastrophic [5]. The need for resilience in communication
infrastructure has been widely recognized as a priority [6–10].
However, malicious attacks are not the only challenge that post-modern in-
ternetworks face. Given the diversity and heterogeneity in the infrastructure,
technology, and applications there is a complete set of challenges that a sys-
tematic resilience approach must consider. For example, emerging mobile
and wireless networks are not only susceptible to malicious attacks but also
face environmental challenges due to the open nature of their communica-
tion channels. In the following section, we attempt to characterize various
challenges faced by communication networks.
1.1 Challenges to Communication Networks
Let us consider the various challenges aﬀecting both traditional and evolving
networks. We characterize these challenges in to the following five categories:
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1. Environmental: The challenges to the communication environment
include high-mobility of nodes and subnetworks; weak, asymmetric,
and episodic connectivity of wireless channels; and unpredictably-long-
delay paths either due to length (e.g. satellite) or as a result of episodic
connectivity.
2. Malicious: These include attacks against the network hardware, soft-
ware, or protocol infrastructure from recreational crackers, industrial
espionage, terrorism, or warfare.
3. Non-malicious: Failures due to misconfiguration or operational er-
rors; unusual but legitimate traﬃc load (e.g. flash crowds); accidents
leading to component failures.
4. Large scale disasters: Large-scale natural disasters such as hurri-
canes, earthquakes, ice storms, tsunami, and floods as well as man
made disasters such as large scale power failures.
5. Lower level failures: The service failure at a lower level (or layer) is
a challenge to the higher layers. For example, the failure of paths (at
link layers) is a challenge to the network layer. A detailed discussion
of this challenge is presented in Section 4.1.1
A detailed explanation of each of these challenge categories along with ex-
amples of past failures is presented in the [11]. Besides the above mentioned
challenges, the network is also subjected to inherent faults in the system
3
such as design flaws, defective components, and software bugs. These faults
manifest as dormant faults in the network and activate only when triggered
either through challenges or normal operation of the system. Given the fact
that the networks are constantly facing a variety of challenges, we investigate
how to measure the ability of the network to tolerate these challenges.
1.2 Goodness Measure
In order to study the impact of the above mentioned challenges on various
systems, several disciplines have evolved over time. These include fault tol-
erance, survivability, disruption tolerance, and traﬃc tolerance. We present
the formal definitions below:
• Fault Tolerance: “The ability of a functional entity to mask or mit-
igate the impact of faults on its specified operation” [12]. In other
words, it is the ability of a system to tolerate component faults such
that service failures do not result. Fault tolerance generally covers sin-
gle or at most a few faults, and is thus a subset of survivability. It is
generally used in the context of component failures.
• Survivability: “The capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in
a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.”
[13, 14]. It is often agreed that survivability handles a larger set of
faults and failures as compared to other measures (in particular, fault
tolerance).
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• Disruption Tolerance: “The ability of a system to tolerate disrup-
tions in connectivity among its components, consisting of the environ-
mental and tolerance of energy (or power) challenges” [11].
• Traﬃc Tolerance: “The ability of a system to tolerate unpredictable
oﬀered load without a significant drop in carried load (including con-
gestion collapse), as well as to isolate the eﬀects from cross traﬃc, other
flows, and other nodes” [11].
In order to diﬀerentiate networks and services in terms of their ability to meet
the objectives of the above mentioned disciplines, there is a need for some sort
of goodness measure. There have been several such measures proposed in the
literature and many of these are often applied in industry as well. Depending
upon the context of service being oﬀered, these measures characterize and
quantify diﬀerent aspects of a system. Furthermore, many of the measures
defined in the literature overlap with one another. Some of the well-known
measures and their definitions are:
• Reliability: “The probability that an entity (unit) will complete its
intended mission (i.e. perform a required function) as required over a
specified period of time in its intended environment (or stated condi-
tions)” [12, 15, 16].
• Availability: “The proportion of the operating time in which an en-
tity meets its in-service functional and performance requirements in its
intended environment” [12,15,16].
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• Dependability: “Dependability is that property of a system such that
reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers” [15]. There
are diﬀerent facets of dependability. The various attributes of depend-
ability include availability (readiness for usage), reliability (continuity
of service), correctness of service and maintainability [16, 17].
• Performability: Performability is the probability that the system will
stay above a certain accomplishment level over a fixed period of time.
It is often described by the QoS (quality of service) measures for a given
set of operational conditions [18].
We use the term resilience to include all of these measures, defined as [2,11]:
Definition 1.2.1. The ability of the network to provide and maintain an ac-
ceptable level of service in the face of various faults and challenges to normal
operation.
Resilience includes the ability for users and applications to access information
when needed (e.g. Web browsing and sensor monitoring), the maintenance
of end-to-end communication association (e.g. tele- and video-conferences),
and the operation of distributed processing and networked storage in the
presence of challenges discussed in Section 1.1.
Henceforth, in this document, we shall refer to resilience as the property that
is superset to all the other properties mentioned in this section.
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1.3 Problem Statement
Researchers agree that due to lack of consistency in evaluating network re-
silience, it is diﬃcult to guarantee that the networks being designed and
developed would satisfy the requirements of both the end users and their
applications [19]. Without standard metrics to measure the relative eﬀec-
tiveness of resilience mechanisms, it is diﬃcult to identify potential solutions
that lead to resilient networks. While it is clear that a number of new and
innovative solutions are needed to provide network resilience, a key problem
is how to measure and specify resilience. We need a methodology to measure
the resilience (or lack thereof) of current and proposed networks and evalu-
ate the benefit of architectures, designs, and mechanisms. This methodology
needs to be both rigorous in capturing service parameters and operational
metrics, as well as tractable so that it is useful in practice. The challenge is
to bring order to a fundamentally complex problem; we do not underestimate
the diﬃculty in this task and note that the QoS (quality of service) commu-
nity has struggled with a related problem for some years. The development
of resilience measures is further complicated by the heterogeneity of com-
munication networks. In other words, a resilience scheme that applies well
to a specific network scenario may not work as well on a diﬀerent network
scenario.
Secondly, the resilience strategy must be multilevel. As we will argue in
this dissertation, it is necessary to improve the resilience of a communication
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network at each layer in the protocol stack. Hence the proposed resilience
evaluation methodology must support the multilevel approach. With this
discussion, we arrive at our thesis statement :
A multilevel two-dimensional state-space framework can be used
to quantify the resilience of networked systems, and be the basis
of understanding the resilience of current networks as well as eval-
uating the ability of new mechanisms to improve future network
resilience, survivability, and disruption tolerance.
The goal of this dissertation is to develop such a framework and utilize it
to develop and evaluate new resilience mechanisms for challenged networks,
especially at the topology and routing sub-layers.
1.4 Proposed Solution
We propose a new multilevel framework to measure and analyze network re-
silience at a given layer boundary. Resilience is eﬀectively quantified as
robustness, which measures service degradation in the presence of challenges
(perturbations) to the operational state of the network. Hence, the network
can be viewed (at any layer) as consisting of two orthogonal dimensions as
shown in Figure 1.1: one is the operational state of the network, which con-
sists of its physical infrastructure and their protocols; the second dimension
is the service being provided by the network and its requirements [20]. We
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Figure 1.1: Network state space
characterize these two dimensions using operational metrics and service pa-
rameters respectively. Note that both of these dimensions are multi-variate
and there is a clear mapping between the operational metrics and service pa-
rameters. Simply put, for a given set of operational conditions, the network
provides a certain level of service for a given application. Thus, the state
of a network is an aggregate of several points in this two dimensional space,
represented as Si in Figure 1.1.
In order to limit the number of states, the operational and service space of
the network may be divided into three regions each as shown in Figure 1.1.
The network operational space is divided into normal, partially degraded,
and severely degraded regions. Similarly, the service space is divided into
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acceptable, impaired, and unacceptable regions. While an arbitrary number
of such regions is possible, one of the primary goals of this work is to achieve
tractable yet useful solutions, and this set of nine (3×3) regions provides the
necessary abstraction while limiting the number total regions. Each region
may contain multiple states if the service demands such a fine granularity.
In the limiting case, each region represents just one state.
Adverse events (challenges) are manifest as degradations in the operational
condition of the network. When such events degrade the operational state of
the network, the level of service being provided degrades as well resulting in
state transitions, e.g., S1 → S2 and S2 → S3. We then evaluate resilience as
the trajectory of the network through this state space and measure resilience
as the area under this trajectory. The result is that based on a characteri-
zation of metrics for network operation and service requirement parameters,
we are able to analyze and quantify the resilience of a network in the face of
various faults, challenges, and attacks. We believe that this is a critical part
of understanding, designing, and evaluating the resilience, survivability, and
trustworthiness of networks.
Lastly, we utilize the proposed framework to devise a resilience strategy for
defensive networks as well as for resilient topology and routing in case studies
involving millimeter-wave networks and highly-dynamic airborne MANETs.
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1.5 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation are as follows:
1. A multilevel resilience framework to quantify network resilience based
on state transitions. We propose metrics to quantify the operational
state of the network at various levels. Similarly, we define service pa-
rameters to quantify topology, routing, transport service.
2. A methodology to analyze the steady state resilience at any layer
boundary. This enables the user to compare and contrast compet-
ing mechanisms in terms of their resilience benefits. For example, two
diﬀerent network topologies can be compared to see which one provides
better resilience by evaluating the area under the state space trajectory.
3. A methodology for transient analysis of resilience strategy. The in-
stantaneous states of the network shifts farther away from the origin as
it experiences various challenges (failures, attacks, etc). On the other
hand, the state transitions towards the origin due to remediation and
recovery mechanisms. An analysis of these transition quantifies the
overall resilience of a network in defending against attacks.
4. Resilient routing mechanisms in millimeter-wave mesh and aeronauti-
cal telemetry networks. Using the proposed resilience framework, we
designed and evaluated resilient routing algorithm for two scenarios: a
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cross-layered predictive weather-assisted routing protocol (P-WARP)
to provide reliable communication in the presence of weather disrup-
tions to millimeter-wave mesh networks and a location-aware highly-
adaptive routing protocol (AeroRP) to provide acceptable service in a
highly-dynamic airborne network.
5. Resilience topologies: We developed a model to generate realistic net-
work topologies and used the resilience framework to evaluate the im-
pact of graph properties on the resilience of the topologies for several
applications. As a part of this work, we developed a location and cost
constrained network topology generator (KU-LoCGen).
6. Resilience strategy: We developed formal methods to characterize the
resilience strategy: D2R2 + DR. We present case studies to show the
impact of each phase of resilience strategy on the overall resilience of
the network.
7. Evaluation of various scenarios in MATLAB and ns-3: We conducted
simulations to demonstrate the use of the propose metrics framework
in diﬀerent scenarios. A simulation based analysis was conducted to
quantify resilience at a number of levels (topology, routing, transport),
for a number of diﬀerent networks (ISP topologies, MANETs, and mesh
networks).
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Chapter 2
Related Work
While the generic concept of reliability has been in literature for a very
long time, specific disciplines such as fault-tolerance, reliability, availability,
dependability, vulnerability, and survivability have been rigorously studied
over the past several decades. As discussed in Chapter 1, we use the term
resilience as the superset of the above disciplines and properties. There is
also a varied set of targeted systems over which resilience studies have been
conducted. For example, resilience studies have been conducted on com-
puter systems, operating systems, software development, control systems,
and mechanical systems. More recently, telecommunication systems such as
the PSTN (public switched telephone network) and Internet have become
one of the focus areas for resilience analysis. Due to the vast nature of the
subject area and the diﬀerences in the resilience analysis for each area, we
will primarily focus our discussion on the previous research eﬀorts in the field
of telecommunication networks.
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The earliest works in fault tolerance that were published include the 1965
Moore and Shannon paper [21] on reliable circuits and the Peirce [22] and
Avizienis [23] papers on fault tolerant computing. The initial work on reliabil-
ity and fault tolerance was focused on the design of computing systems [24].
In 1974, one of first resilience works in communication networks was pre-
sented by Frank [25,26] as the survivability analysis of command and control
networks in the context of military systems.
The inability to design systems with suﬃcient redundancy to overcome all
failures was realized in late 1970’s in the context of fault-tolerant computing
systems [27–29]. Hence the concept of degradable systems was introduced in
which the system has at least some degraded performance under the pres-
ence of faults with out failing completely. Markov models are used to evaluate
the performance and reliability of the degradable system by Huslende [30],
Meyer [31], Gay [32], and others. Meyer [31] first coined the term performa-
bility as the probability that the system will stay above a certain accomplish-
ment level over a fixed period of time [18]. Until then, reliability and perfor-
mance of communication networks were treated separately. Huslende [30] de-
fined performance as the second dimension of the classical reliability, thereby
defining reliability of a degradable system as the probability that the system
will operate with a performance measure above certain threshold. The sys-
tem is then represented with continuous time discrete states and the Markov
model is used to calculate the reliability and availability based on the proba-
bility that the system will remain in states such that aggregate performance
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measure of all the visited states is above a certain threshold.
Often communication systems were considered a special class of distributed
real-time systems. Hence, the same techniques that are used to evaluate
distributed systems were used to evaluate the resilience of communication
networks. Lately, rigorous analytical definitions of survivability, reliability
and availability [13,17,33] were developed that apply to all systems in general.
In the following sections we present detailed computational methods to eval-
uate the resilience characteristics of telecommunication networks.
2.1 Resilience Computation Methods
We now further narrow our survey of literature to delve into the specific
frameworks developed to compute and quantify the various aspects of re-
silience such as reliability, availability, vulnerability, and survivability. While
considering papers in related areas, we focus primarily on communication
network related frameworks. In order to provide structure to this large body
of research, we divide it in to the following six categories: topology based
evaluation, survivability and reliability frameworks, security and vulnerability
analysis, fault injection and visualization schemes, service oriented resilience
metrics, and passive monitoring.
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2.1.1 Topology Based Evaluation
Research eﬀorts have focussed on the two most common failure events: node
and link failures. In other words, the connectivity of the underlying topology
is a primary measure of resilience. Techniques commonly used for topology
analysis include graph theory and linear algebra. This method is well suited
to analyze the resilience of transport networks in which the reliability of the
physical links is vital.
Liew and Lu suggest a survivability characterization schemes specifically in
the presence of large-scale disasters [34, 35]. They propose a network sur-
vivability function that can be used to derive the actual survivability of the
network with respect to the service metric of interest that measures the
“goodness” of the network. The primary failures of the network considered
are the node and link failures. The survivability function, S is defined as:
P [S = s] =
￿
e:Se=s
Pe (2.1)
where the s is the fraction of nodes still connected and Se is the fraction
of nodes that remain connected when a sample node failure event e occurs
with a probability of Pe. The expected survivability E[S] and worst case
survivability s0, are then calculated as:
E[S] =
￿
s
sP [S = s] (2.2)
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s0 = minP [S=s]>0 s (2.3)
Similarly, the r-percentile survivability and the probability of zero survivabil-
ity can be calculated.
Antonopoulos proposed a metrication framework to assess the performance
of ring-based transport networks [36]. In this work, network unavailability
due to link failures is the primary concern. Metrics based on path unavail-
ability are used to determine the resilience of the network. A worst case path
unavailability, PUw, defines the unavailability of the longest path in the net-
work. The average unavailability, PUa, of a network with n paths is defined
as:
PUa =
￿n
i=1 PUi
n
(2.4)
Finally, the deviation of the network unavailabilities , ∆PU, is calculated as
∆PU =
￿n
i=1 |PUi − PUa|
nPUa
(2.5)
where the unavailability Ui, of any path i is given as
Ui = 1− Ai = MTTR
MTBF +MTTR
(2.6)
where MTTR is the mean time to recover and MTBF is the mean time
between failures. Hence a measure of goodness of the network is given by
PUa and the distribution is given by ∆PU.
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2.1.2 Survivability and Reliability Frameworks
In 2004, Westmark [37] surveyed an impressive 107 papers out of a se-
lected 270 computational survivability papers from research databases such
as ACM, IEEE and SEI. The objective of the author was to summarize the
standard method to compute survivability. However, it was concluded that
there is no consensus among the research community on the definition or
evaluation methods of survivability. Furthermore, it was noticed that indi-
vidual areas have unique interpretation of the idea. The author proposes a
composite template to characterize survivability such that it is applicable to
all the research areas in general:
Survivability = the ability of a given system with a given intended
usage to provide a pre-specified minimum level of service in the
event of one or more pre-specified threats [37, pg. 7]
The author claims that survivability must be context-specific. Hence a sur-
vivability characterization must include the system environment, the usage
service, minimum level of service and the specific threats.
As opposed to purely topological frameworks, Gan and Helvik [38] recognize
that dependability models should also consider the dynamic and behavioral
characteristics of the networks such as changes in topology, routes and traﬃc
loads. Since the underlying network model has to consider above mentioned
properties in addition to the connectivity, the state space increases dramat-
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ically subsequently leading to increased complexity. Stochastic activity net-
works (SAN) are used to model both the faults of components as well as the
dynamics of the network. In order to tackle the problem of state-space explo-
sion, the authors propose limiting state space at the model level by limiting
the state generation to most probable states.
Another approach to compute resilience is to derive a closed form survivabil-
ity function [39]. A survivability function is derived for random occurrence
of failure (ROF) of nodes and links while considering the eﬀects of routing
protocol and traﬃc demand. Network survivability is defined as “the prob-
ability function of the percentage of total data delivered in the event of a
failure” [39]. Furthermore, survivability attributes are used as a measure of
disaster-based routing performance. The network is modeled as a directed
graph Γ(N , A), where N is the set of nodes |N | = N and A is the set of
directed arcs |A| = M . The network topology is described by the incidence
matrix A and the traﬃc demand between the nodes is specified by demand
matrix R. Each arch em ∈ A has a capacity given by cm. A failure scenario
ζ is defined a set of component failures, e.g. ND nodes out of N nodes or
MD links out of M link. Assuming that each failure, ζ occurs with a specific
probability P (ζ), and is independent of all other failures, the survivability
function is then defined as:
S(x) =
￿
ζ:X(ζ)=x
P (ζ) (2.7)
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where the random variable X(ζ) represents the percentage of flow delivered
after the failure ζ. The “survivability function S(x) is the sum of probabili-
ties of all failure scenarios in which x percent of total flow is still delivered”.
In order to simplify the calculations, uniform link failure distribution is as-
sumed. Hence the probability of each link failure in a network with M edges
is M−1. The probability of a failure scenario P (ζ) with MD faulty (failed)
links is given by:
P (ζ) =
MD￿
l=1
1
M
M−MD￿
k=1
M − 1
M
(2.8)
The above probability function P (ζ) decreases very quickly with the increase
in MD. Therefore a cumulative probability mass function (CPM) is used to
achieve a fixed threshold (e.g. 99%). Furthermore, the number of diﬀerent
scenarios (combinations) that lead to MD faults is given by:
LMD =
 M
MD
 = M !
MD!(M −MD)! (2.9)
The increase in the CPM due to the failure scenario ζ is given as:
vMD = LMD × P (ζ) (2.10)
Hence the overall failure probability is obtained by adding the probability of
a scenario with zero link failures, one link failure, two link failures, all the
way up to all link failures. However, due to decreasing contribution from
higher link failures, we can achieve a 99% CPM with relatively small number
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of scenarios. Finally, the authors also calculate the eﬀect of shortest path
routing given the overall failure probability. A linear programming formula-
tion is used to derive the optimal feasible multicommodity flows for a given
network. The survivability of the network is then calculated as the fraction
of the total flow that is delivered considering the overall failure probability
for a given traﬃc load. The traﬃc load is specified as a percent of the opti-
mal feasible multicommodity flows. One such analysis on a Polish backbone
network consisting of 12 nodes and 34 links has been conducted [39]. It was
observed that the eﬀect of failures is worst in case of higher traﬃc loads and
node failures.
One rigorous survivability evaluation method is described by Knight [33], in
which a system is said to be survivable if it satisfies or complies with the sur-
vivability specification. Therefore, much emphasis is placed on survivability
specification, which is quoted as follows: [33]
Definition 2.1.1. A survivability specification is a four-tuple, {E,R, P,M}
[33,40] where:
• E is a statement of the assumed operating environment for the system.
It includes details of the various hazards to which the system might
be exposed together with all of the external operating parameters. To
the extent possible, it must include any anticipated changes that might
occur in the environment.
• R is a set of specifications each of which is a complete statement of a
tolerable form of service that the system must provide. This set will
include one distinguished element that is the normal or preferred spec-
ification, i.e. the specification that provides the greatest value to the
user and with which the system is expected to comply most of the time.
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• P is a probability mass function across the set of specifications, R. A
probability is associated with each member of the set R with the sum of
these probabilities being one. The probability associated with the pre-
ferred specification defines the fraction of operating time during which
the preferred specification must be operational.
• M is a finite-state machine denoted by the four-tuple {S, s0, V, T} with
the following meanings:
– S: A finite set of states each of which has a unique label which is
one of the specifications defined in R.
– s0: s0 ∈ S is the initial or preferred state for the machine.
– V : A finite set of customer values.
– T : A state transition matrix.
This definition of survivability is frequently used by a researchers developing
methods to quantitatively evaluate survivability [40, 41].
2.1.3 Security and Vulnerability Analysis
Research has also been conducted to evaluate the resilience of networks with
emphasis on the security aspects. Here the vulnerability of the networks to
attacks and failures is used as a measure of the goodness of the network.
More recently, methods developed to evaluate dependability such as state-
based model checking and combinatorial techniques are being leveraged to
evaluate the security of the system [42].
A framework to analyze the network as well as service vulnerabilities under
the presence of attacks, specifically the distributed denial of service (DDOS)
attacks has been developed [43, 44]. A three step method is described: 1)
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develop metrics to identify network vulnerabilities, 2) characterize the state
of the network in to three states, and 3) evaluate a application or network
vulnerability index (VI) based on the vulnerability metrics. The vulnerability
index function is used to quantify the network services under attacks and
failures.
The authors propose a set of global metrics to evaluate the eﬀect of faults
on the network systems. In order to monitor these metrics, an agent module
is placed at each network entity that collects data and recognizes individual
attacks as well as correlation eﬀects due to one or more attacks. The data
gathered from these agents is used to derive the vulnerability index with
respect to each metric. Simulation conducted using three subnets with DDoS
attacks showed that the VI correctly predicts the potential vulnerabilities in
the network.
Similarly, Guirguis [45] developed metrics to quantify the damage cause due
to reduction of quality (RoQ) type attacks and to measure the potency of
the attack.
2.1.4 Fault Injection and Visualization Schemes
Various resilience evaluation schemes have been developed based on the fault
injection method. The idea is to model a network and inject various expected
and unexpected faults in the network. The fraction of the service delivered
after the failure is the measure of resilience. This research is particularly
helpful during the design and planning state of the network.
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Jha and Wing present a survivability analysis framework for networked sys-
tems based on fault injection and visualization techniques [46,47]. The gen-
eral method outlined in their research involves modeling the network using
state machines. Faults are injected in to the network as node and link fail-
ures. The survivability metrics include the physical connectivity of the net-
work and some measure of system service. The analysis method consists of
generating the sequence of states the network traverses upon the introduction
of faults. The service measure of the final state determines the survivability
of the network for the given fault that was injected. In order to evaluate the
reliability, the random occurring faults are considered. Bayesian networks
are used to specify the probabilities of individual faults as well as correlated
and conditional faults. Constrained Markov decision processes are used to
evaluate the reliability of the network.
2.1.5 Service Oriented Resilience Metrics
The resilience of the network can be evaluated specifically in terms of the
service delivered to the end user. At every abstraction level, the service of
the network to higher entity is defined and statistical averages are used to
quantify the its resilience against various faults and challenges.
The eﬀects of network disruptions to end users has been widely studied.
Zolfaghari and Kaudel evaluated the outage in the network as a (U,D,W )
triple, where the unservability (U) is the percentage of unsuccessful attempts
at obtaining a service; duration (D) is the length of time for which the service
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is unavailable; and weight (W) is a measure of the impact of the service
failure such as number of people and area aﬀected [1]. The author presents
a multi-layer approach, in which each layer serves is responsible to provide
service to upper layers. Furthermore, the link capacity of a higher layer
generates traﬃc for the layer below. Due to the multilayer approach, failures
in given layer can be guarded against at that layer or at a higher layer. The
authors also introduce two methods of survivability analysis based on the
statistical nature of the failures. The first approach is based on random
occurrence of failures (ROF), in which failures are assumed to adhere to a
given probability distribution. The second method is a conditional approach,
in which the survivability of the network is evaluated for a given failure.
Furthermore, this paper introduces the concept of using diﬀerent measures
to quantify the survivability at diﬀerent layers. A step-by-step procedure
to calculate the survivability measures for both ROF and GOF methods is
also presented. This procedure involves obtaining the failure occurrence data
(random or given), defining a survivability measurement and then listing all
the combination of events that can occur for the failure under consideration.
For each event, the survivability measure is calculated.
An example of this approach is shown in Figure 2.1, where a survivability
measure x, is being captured under a failure scenario. For a given survivabil-
ity measure, the following survivability attributes can be defined [1].
Sa: fraction of x that remains after failure (before restoration)(1− U)
Su: fraction of x unservable after failure (U)
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Figure 2.1: Example of survivability attributes (adapted from [1])
Sr: the fraction of x that is restored at t1
t0: the time the failure occurs
tr: the duration required until fraction Sa + Sr of x is restored
tR: the duration required until all of x (t2) is restored (D)
Assuming that Sa, Su, Sr are random variables, the survivability function is
the probability distribution function f(y). Based on this approach, the ex-
pected values of the survivability attributes can be obtained as:
E[Sa] =
￿
y
yP [Sa = y] (2.11)
E[Sr] =
￿
y
yP [Sr = y] (2.12)
E[tr] =
￿
y
yP [tr = y] (2.13)
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The above measures can be used to estimate the survivability of any given
service layer against failures based on a given survivability measure.
The ATIS/ANSI T1A1.2 working group on network survivability perfor-
mance have produced a number of documents on evaluation of network re-
silience and have recommended standard metrics to be used by the telecom-
munications industry. A framework to quantify the severity of failure events
in terms of user service outage has been presented [12,19]. Based on the pop-
ular distinction in the industry between network supplier, service provider
and end user, the metrics framework is divided in to the following two do-
mains [19]:
• Network service provider domain consists of metrics that char-
acterize the end users’ service reliability requirements with respect to
the cost of maintenance. For IP networks, these include the service
downtime, service denial, loss of data probability, service failure, main-
tenance downtime, billing downtime, network upgrade cost and spares
inventory cost. These various downtime metrics are specified as the
percentage of the total operation time.
• Network supplier’s domain consists of metrics to quantify the re-
silience of the network solutions such that the network service provider’s
requirements are met. These metrics deal with the network infrastruc-
ture and the technologies implemented. Sample metrics are service
outage failure rate, interruption failure rate, service outage downtime,
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fault isolation, repairability, link and node restoration time, network
failure containment.
The objective of the above metrics is to optimize the network infrastructure
costs while maintaining the end user service reliability requirements. These
metrics can be applied at various network abstraction levels.
Similarly, Grover [17] has established resilience measures such as user-lost er-
langs, (U,D,E) triples, and other restorability indexes for specific networks.
2.1.6 Passive Monitoring
Passive monitoring is a fairly simple method of evaluating network resilience.
The network administrators monitor key places in a given network and gather
data using dedicated hardware systems or software snooping programs. The
gathered data is then post-processed to generate performance metrics. In the
event of faults and challenges, post-processing can be used to determine the
resilience of the network. Many Internet service providers (ISPs), business
organizations and universities employ this method since it is economical and
can be done at any stage of network operation.
2.2 Summary
Based on this literature survey, it is obvious that network resilience has been
evaluated in several diﬀerent contexts and levels. In summary, resilience is
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evaluated as node and link connectivity based on topology; as point-to-point
or overall capacity of the network; as an ability to survive potential attacks;
or as the reliability seen by the end user. Previous research eﬀorts have
targeted diﬀerent levels of the network. While some focus on the logical
layer (transport network connectivity), others have focused on application
layer (user metrics). While these methods capture some aspects of resilience
in specific scenarios and layers, they do not present a comprehensive view
of resilience at all levels. Resilience evaluation at any level must consider
both aspects of the communication network: the operational condition of
the network and the service delivered. Hence we arrive at the question:
At what abstraction level should resilience be evaluated and what is the best
evaluation methodology?
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Chapter 3
ResiliNets Architecture
This chapter presents a multi-layer resilience architecture from the perspec-
tive of metrics. The metrics framework proposed in this dissertation is specif-
ically designed to support the evaluation of strategy and mechanisms of this
architecture. First we define the fundamental axioms on which the architec-
ture is based. Then we present a unique resilience strategy followed by a set
of principles with which the architecture can be deployed.
There are several existing frameworks that take a systematic approach to-
wards various sub-categories or aspects of resilience. The ANSA (Advanced
Networked Systems Architecture) project [48] framework characterizes de-
pendability using the two-dimensional space of value and time. The ATIS
(Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions) workgroup on network
survivability has developed a framework to quantify network survivability in
a service oriented fashion. This multilevel framework quantifies survivability
over physical, system, logical, and service levels using the notion of unserv-
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ability [12,19] as discussed in Section 2.1.5. The CMU architecture specifies
a 4-step strategy to resilience consisting of resistance, recognition, recovery,
and adaptation and evolution [49]. The architecture presented in this chap-
ter focusses on the resilience of the network at any arbitrary level, which we
defined earlier to be subsuming of all related disciplines 1.
3.1 Axioms
The ResiliNets architecture is based on the following four fundamental ax-
ioms [2].
Axiom A0. Inevitability of Faults
Faults are inevitable. It is not possible to construct perfect fault-free sys-
tems, nor is it possible to prevent challenges and threats. A fault is a flaw
in the system that can cause an error [15, 50]. Internal faults are a result of
imperfections in the design of the system and external faults are triggered
by challenges. It is not possible to design fault free systems due to the diﬃ-
culty in designing perfect systems and predicting all possible challenges nor
practical under cost constraints. A metrics framework to quantify resilience
should be able to quantify the impact of these faults on the system when
activated by challenges.
1This work is a part of the ResiliNets initiative at the University of Kansas and
Lancaster University [2], to which the author of this thesis provided substantial contribu-
tions [11]. It provides a fundamental approach to research and build resilient networks.
32
Axiom A1. Understand Normal Operations
Understanding normal operation is necessary, including the environment, and
application demands. It is only by understanding normal operation that we
have any hope of determining when the network is challenged or threatened
Every network is designed for a set of parameters that are derived from the
anticipated scenarios. These parameters characterize the normal operations
of the network when there are no challenges or attacks to the system. In
order to understand how faults and challenges impact a system, it is neces-
sary to first understand the normal behavior. Hence the metrics framework
should be able to characterize the normal operations of the network as well
as the expected service.
Axiom A2. Expect Adverse Events and Conditions
Expectation and preparation for adverse events and conditions is necessary,
so that that defenses and detection of challenges that disrupt normal oper-
ations can occur. These challenges are inevitable. Adverse events are chal-
lenges to normal operations of the network. These can be either anticipated
events based on past experience or unanticipated events that cannot be pre-
dicted. However, in both cases, resilience warrants the system to be prepared
to respond. One way this can be achieved is to understand the impact of any
adverse event on the network operations. While there are infinitely many
potential challenge scenarios, there is a finite range over which the network
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parameters vary. The resilience framework proposed in Chapter 4 addresses
this issue by characterizing the expected service as the operational parame-
ters of interest vary over their respective ranges.
Axiom A3. Respond to Adverse Events and Conditions
It is clear that response to adverse events and conditions is required for re-
silience, by remediation ensuring correct operation and graceful degradation,
restoration to normal operation, diagnosis of root cause faults, and refine-
ment of future responses. One of the key distinguishing feature of a resilient
network is its ability to respond to adverse events in a manner that preserves
the service being delivered. There are several phases involved in the life cycle
of an attack over a resilient network. The ResiliNets architecture proposes
a specific six stage strategy as discussed in the following section. Further-
more, the metrics framework proposed by this dissertation describes how to
quantify the eﬀectiveness of this strategy.
3.2 Strategy
There is a need for a comprehensive and rigorous strategy towards resilient
networks. Give the fundamental axioms of Section 3.1, it is clear that the re-
silience of the network must be addressed before, during, and after an adverse
event challenges the normal operations. This approach is consistent with the
previously published literature on degradable systems. In this section, we
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present a six-step, two phase resilience strategy, formalized as D2R2 + DR,
under the presence of faults and challenges [11]. Note that this strategy as
shown in Figure 3.1 motivates and determines the requirements for the met-
rics framework discussed in Chapter 4. We first present the strategy and
then discuss the its implications on the metrics framework.
Before discussing the details of the strategy, we consider how challenges af-
fect a system. In a communication network, a challenge can be viewed in two
orthogonal dimensions. First, the challenge can impact the network opera-
tions by causing an active fault that may lead to an failures of the network
components. This causes the network to deviate from its normal operations.
Secondly, this deviation in the operating conditions of the network may re-
sult in the perturbation (degradation) in the service being provided by the
network.
3.2.1 First Phase
The first phase of the strategy is the real-time active loop D2R2 with a passive
core as shown in Figure 3.1. This consists of a cycle of four steps: defend,
detect, remediate, and recover that are involved with the network operations
and service simultaneously. Furthermore, more than one instance of this cycle
may be active in the network, corresponding to individual network modules
or associations, and responds to any network challenge or attack in real time.
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Figure 3.1: ResiliNets strategy
• Defend against challenges and threats to normal operation. The first
step in any resilient system is to defend against challenges so that faults
do not result in observable failures. Hence the network defenses first
attempt to prevent the challenges from triggering failures resulting in
deviation of the normal operations. Secondly, the defense also tries to
isolate these perturbations to the network operational from the service
being provided by the network.
The first aspect of defense is referred commonly as fault tolerance and
survivability and can be achieved by using passive mechanisms such
as redundancy and diversity. The second aspect of the defense is to
prevent the service from being aﬀected even if the challenges occur
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by using active mechanisms of self-protection, e.g. filtering, firewalls.
Examples include use of connectivity paradigms that enable the end-
to-end communication in the face of unstable paths. However, it is not
always possible to be completely defend against challenges, which is
when the system must detect these failures.
• Detect when an adverse event or condition has occurred. As discussed
above, challenges can and will overwhelm network defenses leading to
failures in network operations and service. In this case, it is necessary
for the network to detect this event.
As with defense, detection can occur in two dimensions. First, the
detection mechanism can detect the changes in operational conditions.
This requires the system to understand normal operations (Axiom 1)
and detect deviations from it. Secondly, the system can detect changes
in the service parameters. In order to achieve this, the system must
understand the primary service requirements.
In order to support the first mode of detection, we need to characterize
the normal behavior of the network. This requirement provides the
first guideline for the metrics framework (Chapter 4): the need for
metrics to characterize the operational state of the network and a means
to distinguish normal state from errored state. Similarly, in order to
support the second mode of detection, the metrics framework must
provide a measure to characterize the service as well as a mechanism
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to distinguish the quality of service being provided.
• Remediate the eﬀects of the adverse event or condition to minimize
the impact.
When the defense of the network fails and this is detected, the next
best thing is to remediate the eﬀect of the challenge (perturbation in
operational conditions) on the service delivery. In other words, the
system must take measures to minimize the impact of the failure. For
example, when a link fails, the system must reroute the traﬃc around
failed link. Depending upon the severity of the event, the remediation
mechanism may not be able to keep the service levels to the ones prior
to the adverse event, in which case it must gracefully degrade. This
requires the system to be adaptable and autonomic.
This step of the strategy specifies the second major guideline for the
metrics framework: the ability to characterize performability. Not only
should the framework characterize normal operations and service prop-
erties, it must also quantify the degradation in the service with respect
to degradation in operations.
• Recover to original and normal operations.
Once the adverse event passes over, the network must recover to normal
operations. This requires the network to detect the end of the specific
event and the recovery mechanism should restore the network to its
original state. For example, after the failed link is repaired, the network
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should reroute on the original path (assuming it was the best available
path). The recovery mechanism returns the network operations to the
normal state and subsequently the service quality should return to its
original value. Metrics help both to determine when the challenge is
over and when the network has been restored to its original state.
In order to analyze the resilience of a network under the presence of adverse
events, it is necessary to characterize each of the these phases. Hence the
metrics framework must support representation of each step individually as
well as the entire cycle collectively. In Chapter 4, we present exactly such an
evaluation framework.
3.2.2 Second Phase
The second phase consists of two steps: diagnose and refine (DR). These
background processes observe and modify the behavior of the D2R2 cycle as
shown in Figure 3.1.
• Diagnose the fault that has been the root cause of an error or failure.
Faults cannot be observed or detected directly, they can only be de-
tected only when they manifest as errors or failures. Hence following an
adverse event that was successful in causing a failure, it is necessary to
diagnose the fault that was the root cause of the failures. For example,
lack of suﬃcient redundancy in paths (a design fault) can be diagnosed
after a link cut (challenge or attack) results in a route failure.
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• Refine behavior for the future based on past D2R2 cycles.
After observing how the D2R2 cycle performed in the presence of ad-
verse events, the next step is to refine, enhance, and evolve the process
so that the network is more resilient to future challenges. In the above
example, a redundant link may be added as a hot standby so that
future link cuts do not result in route failures. Metrics measure the
eﬀectiveness of D2R2 inner loop to help analyze how to refine.
In order to determine which refinement mechanisms yield the highest gain in
resilience, it is critical to develop a metrics framework that facilitates such
an evaluation. We carry the requirements presented by this strategy to the
following chapter in designing a metrics framework for quantitative resilience
evaluation.
3.3 Principles
Based on the axioms presented in Section 3.1, synthesis of the strategy pre-
sented in Section 3.2 and past experience of resilience disciplines, a detailed
set of guiding principles has been developed for resilient network [11]. While
the entire set of principles are summarized in Table 3.1, in this section, we
discuss those specific principles that are either directly impacted by or set
requirements for the metrics framework.
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3.3.1 Prerequisites
The following are the prerequisites necessary to build resilient networks:
P1. Service requirements of applications need to be determined to un-
derstand the level of resilience the system should provide.
P2. Normal behaviour of the network is a combination of design and
engineering specification, along with monitoring while unchallenged to
learn the networks normal operational parameters.
P3. Threat and challenge models are essential to understanding and
detecting potential adverse events and conditions.
P4. Metrics quantifying the service requirements and operational state are
needed to measure the operational state and service state to detect and
remediate and quantify resilience to refine future behavior and thus are
critical for quantifying P1 – P3 above.
In order to build resilient systems the measurement, evaluation, and under-
standing of both the operations (normal behaviour) and service (require-
ments) aspect of the network, along with the challenges, is a prerequisite.
Without a framework to quantify these aspects of the network, one cannot
successfully move towards resilience. Therefore, we propose a metrics frame-
work that facilitates these computations in Chapter 4.
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3.3.2 Enablers
The ResiliNets framework identifies a set of enablers that can help funda-
mentally build resilient systems. These include:
P10. Connectivity and association among communicating entities should
be maintained when possible based on eventual stability, but informa-
tion flow should still take place even when a stable end-to-end path
does not exist based on the eventual connectivity model.
P11. Redundancy in space, time, and information increases resilience against
faults and some challenges if defenses are penetrated. This includes
spatial, temporal, informational, operational and implementational re-
dundancies.
P12. Diversity in space, time, medium, and mechanism increases resilience
against challenges to particular choices. Diversity consists of providing
alternatives so that even when challenges impact particular alterna-
tives, other alternatives prevent degradation from normal operations.
P13. Multilevel resilience Multilevel resilience is needed in three orthog-
onal dimensions: Protocol layers in which resilience at each layer pro-
vides a foundation for the next layer above; planes : data, control, and
management; and network architecture inside-out from fault tolerant
components, through survivable subnetwork and network topologies,
to the Global Internetwork including attached end systems.
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All the enablers specified above attempt to improve resilience a network.
However, for a given scenario, it is diﬃcult to evaluate which one or com-
bination of enables yields the best resilience. Another way to look at the
problem is: given a finite fixed cost, which enablers should be applied for a
specific scenario. Our approach to this very complex question is to quantify
the resilience of the network based on a set of operational metrics, thereby
determining which parameters have the highest sensitivity to the resilience
of that particular network and choose enablers to optimize those parameters.
A more detailed analysis of this method will be presented in Chapter 4
3.3.3 Behaviour
The ResiliNets architecture proposes that amongst other behavior one of
the key resilience property is the self-organizing and autonomic behavior as
discussed below:
P16. Self-organizing and autonomic behaviour is necessary for net-
work resilience that is highly reactive with minimal human intervention.
The phases of autonomic networking consist of initialization, auto-
configuration, self-organization, self-managing, self-optimizing, self-dia-
gnosing, and self-repair.
In order to evaluate this autonomic behaviour, we need to evaluate the re-
silience of the network in real-time as the network experiences adverse events.
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While the prerequisite and enabling principles require a steady-state re-
silience evaluation, the behavioral principles require an analysis of transient
resilience. In the following chapter we will introduce a metrics framework
than can achieve both of these objectives.
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Table 3.1: Summary of resilience principles [2]
P1 Service requirements determine the need for network resilience
P2 Normal behavior must be specified, verified, and refined through monitoring
to understand normal operations
P3 Threat and Challenge Models are essential to understanding and detecting
potential adverse events and condition
P4 Metrics are needed to measure and engineer network resilience
P5 Heterogeneity in mechanism, trust, and policy must be addressed
P6 Resource tradeoﬀs determine the deployment of resilience mechanisms
P7 Complexity of the network in general, and resilience in particular, must be
reduced to maximize overall resilience
P8 Multilevel resilience is needed with respect to protocol layer, protocol plane,
and hierarchical network organization
P9 Translucency is needed to control the degree of abstraction vs. the visibility
between levels
P10 Heterogeneity in mechanism, trust, and policy among diﬀerent network
realms is a reality of emerging multi-provider networks; resilient mechanisms
must admit this heterogeneity
P11 Redundancy in space and time increases resilience against faults and some
challenges
P12 Diversity in space, time, medium, and mechanism increases resilience against
challenges to particular choices.
P13 Self-organizing and autonomic behavior is necessary for network resilience
that is highly reactive with minimal human intervention
P14 Security and self-protection are essential properties of entities to defend
against challenges in a resilient network
P15 State management is an essential aspect of networks in general, and resilience
mechanisms in particular; the alternatives of how to distribute and manage
this state are critical to resilience
P16 Connectivity and association among communicating entities should be main-
tained when possible, but information flow should still take place even when
a stable end-to-end path does not exit
P17 Context awareness is necessary for network components to operate au-
tonomously to detect challenges
P18 Adaptability to the network environment is essential for a node
in a resilient network to detect, remediate, and recover from challenges
P18 Evolvability is needed to refine future behavior to improve the response to
challenges, as well as for the network architecture and protocols to respond
to emerging threats and application demands
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Chapter 4
Metrics Framework
We start this chapter by revisiting our thesis statement. A multilevel two-
dimensional state-space framework can be used to quantify the resilience of
networked systems, and be the basis of understanding the resilience of current
networks as well as evaluating the ability of new mechanisms to improve
future network resilience, survivability, and disruption tolerance.
Resilience of a communication network is conventionally specified as a change
in specific performance measures under the presence of individual faults and
challenges. For example, resilience may be specified as the percentage of
traﬃc delivered (performance measure) following an edge router failure. With
this approach, for a complete appraisal of resilience, one must evaluate the
performance measure in all the possible challenge scenarios. However, it
is neither feasible to foresee the unique challenges that a network might
experience, nor practical to characterize and model every challenge. The
only commonality across all challenges is that they manifest as degradations
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in the operational condition of the network. This implies that there is a direct
mapping between the challenges and the operational state of the network in
that the challenges cause the network to deviate from its normal behavior.
Therefore, we propose that resilience should be specified as the change in
level of service delivered under degrading operational state of the network.
Resilience must be quantitatively specified as a function of the operational
condition of the network and the level of service to applications. We present
a new metrics framework based on this basic understanding of network char-
acterization and challenge modeling.
This chapter is organised as follows: First we present an overview of the
proposed framework (Section 4.1) followed by formulation of metrics state
space (Section 4.2). A resilience evaluation using this state space is presented
in Section 4.3. A detailed step-by step methodology to apply the proposed
resilience framework for a given level as well as across multiple levels is il-
lustrated with a numerical examples in Section 4.4. Lastly, we present the
application of this metrics framework in ResiliNets architecture of Chapter 4.
4.1 Overview
We propose a new approach to measure and quantify the resilience of the
network against various challenges and attacks using functional metrics.1
1As part of this characterization, we will also determine a way in which conventional
security mechanisms (such as authentication and integrity) map into these metrics.
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For simplicity, assume that we are interested in evaluating the resilience of
the overall network. In other words, we are considering the resilience at
the application layer interface to the network. A more detailed analysis of
resilience at multiple layers will be presented in Section 4.1.1.
Our approach is a three step process. First, we represent the operational
condition of the network using metrics derived from the fundamental charac-
teristics of the network. These are termed as operational metrics since they
define the operational state of network parameters such as link utilization.
Secondly, the level of service being provided by the network is quantified using
representative functions based on application requirements such as goodput
and delay; these are termed as service parameters. Probability distributions
are used to represent metrics in cases where a single mean value does not
adequately capture the dynamics and distribution of a particular metric.
Hence, the network can be viewed (at any layer) as consisting of two or-
thogonal dimensions as shown in Figure 4.1: one is the operational state of
the network, which consists of its physical infrastructure and their protocols;
the second dimension is the service being provided by the network and its
requirements.
The full representation of the network state, thus requires a knowledge of
both the operational metrics and service parameters at any given instant
of time. Therefore, the third step involves aggregating operational metrics
and their corresponding service parameters into discrete states that we call
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network state represented by the circles in Figure 4.1. Due to the time-
varying nature of these metrics, especially in dynamic networks, a continuous
representation gets increasingly complex with the number of such metrics.
Hence, we choose a discrete representation that scales well with the number
of metrics and service parameters.
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Figure 4.1: Resilience state space
In order to quantify the resilience of the system, we formulate that challenges
in the form of adverse events transform the network from one state to another
based on the severity of the event. Hence, network resilience can be evaluated
in terms of the various network states that can be supported with a given
network infrastructure (e.g. technology and topology) and their transitions
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under the presence of challenges. Evaluating network resilience in this way
eﬀectively quantifies it as a measure of service degradation in the presence of
challenges (perturbations) to the operational state of the network. Therefore,
a comprehensive view of resilience requires the knowledge of quantitative
performance of the network in all the states that it may visit under normal
or adverse conditions.
In order to provide a second level of granularity, the operational and service
space of the network may be divided into three regions each as shown in
Figure 4.1. This purpose of this set of coarse grained regions in which the
states reside is to simplify the resilience analysis. The network operational
space is divided into normal, partially degraded, and severely degraded re-
gions. Similarly, the service space is divided into acceptable, impaired, and
unacceptable regions. While an arbitrary number of such regions is possible,
one of the primary goals of this work is to achieve tractable yet useful solu-
tions, and this set of nine (3× 3) regions provides the necessary abstraction
while limiting the number total regions. Each region may contain multiple
states if the service demands such a fine granularity. In the limiting case,
each region represents just one state.
When an adverse event degrades the operational state of the network, the
level of service being provided degrades as well resulting in state transitions.
For example, Figure 4.1 shows the sample trajectory S0 → S1 that an arbi-
trary application may take through the network if a malicious attack were
to occur. The resilience is then evaluated as the transition of the network
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through this state space. In the simplest case, resilience is the area under
the curve obtained by plotting operational metrics versus service parameters
on a multivariate piecewise axis. For example, when comparing two services
over a given network, the service with a smaller slope (S0 → S1) is consid-
ered more resilient than one with a steeper slope as (S0 → S2) shown in
Figure 4.1.
4.1.1 Multilevel Approach
In this section, we discuss the diﬀerent levels at which resilience is evaluated.
In the literature review, we have seen resilience evaluated at various layers
starting from the physical layer connectivity to the application layer service
outage indexes. We propose that in order to be useful, a resilience framework
should facilitate the evaluation of resilience at any level of abstraction, i.e. it
should have the capability to evaluate resilience at any layer. In our proposed
resilience framework, the service interface can be defined at any layer of
architecture and we consider multilevel resilience an important aspect of our
work. Consider the two scenarios shown in Figure 4.2.
In the first scenario 4.2(a), the service interface is defined at the network path
routing layer2 and the service being provided by the network layer (possibly
to the higher transport layer) is to find and establish paths that meet specific
quality of service requirements. The network layer itself and the layers below
2We divide the traditional network layer functionality into two sub-layers: path routing
and topology. The reason for this will become apparent later in the resilience analysis.
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contribute to the operational state. The ability of a network layer entity, such
as a routing protocol, to find the end-to-end paths is based on the mechanisms
it employs and the connectivity of the topology provided by the lower layers.
Resilience is evaluated as the ability to find quality paths (service parameter)
under the presence of challenges that aﬀect the link connectivity and routing
mechanisms (operational metrics).
Service delivered
(end-to-end paths)
Physical Layer
Link Layer
Path Routing Layer
Topology Sub-Layer
Transport Layer
service boundary
Operational state
Application Layer
(a) Resilience at path routing layer
Physical Layer
Link Layer
Path Routing Layer
Topology Sub-Layer
Transport Layer
Operational state
Service delivered
(end-to-end data transfer)
service boundary
Application Layer
(b) Resilience at transport layer
Figure 4.2: Service interface at architectural layers
This represents one of the challenges categories discussed in Section 1.1: the
service failure at a lower layer is a challenge to the higher layers.
In the second scenario, as shown in Figure 4.2(b), we are interested in eval-
uation of the resilience at the transport layer. Hence the service interface is
defined at the transport layer. The service being provided is the end-to-end
transfer of data segments. The operational state consists of the transport
layer and all the layers below. For example, the quality of paths provided
by the network layer and the state of transport protocols constitute the op-
erational state. Hence resilience is evaluated as the ability to deliver data
53
segments (service parameter) in the presence of adverse conditions that aﬀect
the stability and quality of the end-to-end paths and transport mechanisms
(operational metrics).
Finally, the overall network resilience is evaluated from the user perspec-
tive. In this case all the layers contribute to the operational condition of
the network and the user requirements define the service expected. While
this scenario is particularly useful in evaluating the resilience in terms of
end user requirements, it is equally important to be able to determine re-
silience at diﬀerent levels of abstraction. In fact, such a capability is critical
to development of multilevel resilience mechanisms.
In summary, the multilevel approach consists of defining the operational state
of the network, the service being delivered, and the challenges experienced
at any abstraction level. Then resilience is evaluated as how well the service
is provided under the presence of challenges that aﬀect the operational state
of the network. Note that for the remainder of this document, resilience shall
refer to the overall resilience from end-user perspective unless specifically
stated otherwise.
4.2 Metrics State Space
In this sections, we present the formulation of operational and service state
spaces using metrics as well as overall network states and the mathematical
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relationships between them. Finally, we discuss the impact of challenges on
network states in terms of state transitions.
4.2.1 Operational State Space
Operational metrics capture the operational state of the network at any arbi-
trary service boundary. Let the system S (network at an arbitrary level) be
represented by ￿ operational metrics, NS = {N1, . . . , N￿}. Each operational
metric Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ ￿, is in itself a set of m values, representing all possible
settings of the particular operational metric, Ni = {ni,1, . . . , ni,m}. For ex-
ample, at the physical layer of an ISP network, the number of link failures
and link capacities could be two operational metrics.
Special Case i: If Ni is numeric and ordered, then it is a set of ￿ values,
Ni = {ni, . . . , ni}, where ni and ni represent the lower and upper limit of the
ith operational metric, respectively.
Special Case ii: If Ni is numeric, ordered, and continuous then it is a set of
all real values bounded by [ni, ni].
The operational state space of S is NS = ×iNi where × represents the cross
product operator. Therefore, the operational state space consists of all pos-
sible combinations of the operational metrics.
—————————————————————————————————
Example 1: Consider a system S with two operational metrics,
NS = {N1, N2}. Assume that each operational metric has three pos-
sible settings (range). Therefore, N1 = {n1,1, n1,2, n1,3} and N2 =
{n2,1, n2,2, n2,3}. Then the operational state space is given as:
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NS = {(n1,1, n2,1), (n1,1, n2,2), (n1,1, n2,3), (n1,2, n2,1), (n1,2, n2,2),
(n1,2, n2,3), (n1,3, n2,1), (n1,3, n2,2), (n1,3, n2,3)}
—————————————————————————————————
We now define an operational state, N as a subset of the complete state space
NS . Therefore, N is an operational state if N ⊆ NS . Let NS be a set of
operational states, NS = {N1, . . . ,Nk}. NS is valid if NS is a partition of
NS . That is Ni ∩ Nj = ∅,Ni,Nj ∈ NS and i ￿= j and ∪iNi = NS where
∪ represents the union operator. Hence, in the generic case, an operational
state is defined as a subset of NS .
Special Case i: If Ni is numeric and ordered ∀i such that Ni ∈ NS , then the
kth operational state Nk can be defined using the same notation used to define
the complete state space instead of specifying it as a subset of NS . Therefore,
Nk = {N1k, . . . , Nik, . . . , N￿k}. A member Nik in the set Nk is in itself a set
of valid values bounded by [nik, nik], representing the lower and upper limit
of the ith operational metric. We can now define Nik ≡ {nik, . . . , nik}. Thus
Nik represents the set of ith operational metric values that correspond to the
operational state Nk. However, note that irrespective of the way in which the
individual states are defined, an operational state Nk is always a partition of
the state space NS .
Definition A. If the ith operational metric of a network at a given instant
of time t is ni(t), then the necessary condition for the network to be in op-
erational state Nk is ∀ {i : Nik ∈ Nk}, ni(t) ∈ Nik. In the special case of
continuous Nik, the necessary condition can be stated as ∀ {i : Nik ∈ Nk},
nik ≤ ni(t) ≤ nik.
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The network properties that are used in deriving operational metrics depend
upon the type of network and the specific layer at which resilience is being
categorized. Later in this chapter we will present an example of how oper-
ational metrics are obtained for a mobile wireless ad hoc network. Lastly,
various security concerns can be captured using operational metrics. For ex-
ample, malicious attacks that aﬀect the physical state or behavior of network
components can be modeled using metrics. The challenge lies in developing
a compact set of metrics that are easy to understand and practical in current
networks.
4.2.2 Service State Space
We now present the service state space which is orthogonal to the operational
state space. The service parameters capture the requirement of the service
that is being provided across the service interface. For example, the ser-
vice from the transport layer to the application layer can be quantified using
end-to-end delay in case of a voice application (in which latency aﬀects the
quality of service of the voice chat). Let the the system S (network at an arbi-
trary level) be represented by ￿ service parameters, PS = {P1, . . . , P￿}. Each
service parameter Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ￿, is in itself a set of m values (representing
all possible values of the particular service parameter), Pi = {pi,1, . . . , pi,m}.
For example, service parameters metrics such as largest connected component
and clustering coeﬃcient may be used to characterize the topology service.
Special Case i: If Pi is numeric and ordered, then it is a set of ￿ values,
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Pi = {pi, . . . , pi}, where pi and pi represent the lower and upper limit of the
ith service parameter, respectively.
Special Case ii: If Pi is numeric, ordered, and continuous then it is a set of
all real values bounded by [p
i
, pi].
The service state space of S is PS = ×iPi. Therefore, the service state space
consists of all possible combinations of the service parameters.
—————————————————————————————————
Example 2: Consider a system S with two service parameters, PS =
{P1, P2}. Assume that each operational metric has three possible set-
tings (range). Therefore, P1 = {p1,1, p1,2, p1,3} and P2 = {p2,1, p2,2, p2,3}.
Then the operational state space is given as:
PS = {(p1,1, p2,1), (p1,1, p2,2), (p1,1, p2,3), (p1,2, p2,1), (p1,2, p2,2),
(p1,2, p2,3), (p1,3, p2,1), (p1,3, p2,2), (p1,3, p2,3)}
—————————————————————————————————
We now define a service state, P, as a subset of the complete state space
PS . Therefore, P is a service state if P ⊆ PS . Let PS be a set of service
states, PS = {P1, . . . ,Pk}. PS is valid if PS is a partition of PS . That is,
Pi ∩ Pj = ∅,Pi,Pj ∈ PS and i ￿= j and ∪iPi = PS . In a generic case, service
states are specified as partitions of the complete service state space.
Special Case i: If Pi is numeric and ordered, then the kth service state can be
represented as Pk = {P1k, . . . , Pik, . . . , P￿k}. A member Pik in the set Pk is in
itself a set of values bounded by [p
ik
, pik], representing the lower and upper
limit of the ith service metric. We can define Pik ≡
￿
p
ik
, . . . , pik
￿
. Thus, Pik
represents the set ith service parameter values that correspond to the service
state Pk.
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Definition B. If the ith service parameter of a network at a given time
instant t is pi(t), then the necessary condition for the network to be in service
state Pk is ∀ {i : Pik ∈ Pk}, pi(t) ∈ Pik. In the special case of continuous Pik,
the necessary condition can be stated as ∀ {i : Pik ∈ Pk}, pik ≤ pi(t) ≤ pik.
The service parameters invariably depend upon the service and application
being supported. Hence the resilience of the network must be evaluated
in terms of the particular service metric that is critical for the application.
Given this framework, it is also possible for new and emerging application
to define new metrics. Furthermore, the some of the data security issues
such as confidentiality, integrity and authentication are modeled as service
requirements. That is, an application requests the security services that it
deems necessary.
4.2.3 Network State
As discussed earlier, in order to characterize a network at a service boundary
we need to define both operational state and service state of the network.
Hence, we define the overall state SS of the system S, (also termed as network
state) as a tuple of operational state and service state: (N,P). Therefore the
kth network state Sk = (Nk,Pk)
This overall state of the system SS represents a mapping between the opera-
tional state space NS and service state space PS . Furthermore, this mapping
is an onto mapping, meaning that for every service state there is an opera-
tional state. There are no service states without a corresponding operational
state. In other words, all service states are derived from the system.
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In a deterministic system, the mapping of NS to PS is functional, mean-
ing that for each operational state there is one and only one service state.
However, if the system is stochastic then this mapping is also stochastic in
which one operational state maps to multiple service states based on the
randomness in the execution of the system. This is particularly true of the
Monte-Carlo simulations and analysis presented in Chapter 5 and 6.
On order to eliminate the stochastic nature of the NS to PS mapping, in
our analysis, we present the NS to PS mapping, thereby focussing on the
mapping of aggregates rather than individual operational or service states.
In other words, instead of looking at the mapping of a instantaneous value
of link failure probability (operational metric) to the largest component size
(service parameter), we focus on the mapping of normal operating range of
the link failure probability (operational state) to acceptable region of the
largest connected component size (service state).
Lastly note that a single service state can occur (or be derived) from multiple
operational states. Also note that every operational state must map to a
service state and therefore we have a complete description of the behavior of
the system in terms of service states. In both the operational metrics and
service parameters are numeric and ordered, we can define the following:
Proposition 1. For a given service boundary, if the ith metric of a network
at an instant t is ni(t) and the jth service parameter of a network at an in-
stant t is pj(t), then the network is said to be in a state Sk if and only if
∀ {i : Nik ∈ Nk} , ni(t) ∈ Nik and ∀ {j : Pjk ∈ Pk} , pj(t) ∈ Pjk.
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Proposition 1 suggests that every state of the network is defined by a unique
set of operational metrics Nk corresponding to the operational state Nk and a
set of service parameters Pk corresponding to the service state Pk. However,
each element of the set Nk and Pk is in itself a range of values thereby
providing some region for the network to move around within a given state.
We term these as sub-states. When the stimulus to the network drives the
network beyond the range of the current state both in terms of operating
region and network performance, the network is said to be in a diﬀerent
state altogether.
For example, consider the state space shown in the Figure 4.3. There are two
states S1 and S2, in which each state is represented by three operational met-
rics N1k, N2k, N3k and two service parameters P1k, P2k. The internal points
such as S1(t) within each state represent sub-states based on the instan-
taneous values of operational metrics and service parameters. Since each
sub-state refers to a single point value of the each of the operational metrics
and service parameters, there are a very large number of these instantaneous
sub-states within a given state. However, as long as the operational metrics
and service parameters are in the range of N1 and P1, the network remains in
state S1. When a perturbation of larger magnitude results in a change that
exceeds the range of P11 or P21, the network moves to a diﬀerent state S2.
The challenge in this formulation is to limit the number of states to manage-
able value while achieving the required granularity is the services. However,
the number of states are limited by the granularity of service required. For
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Figure 4.3: Composition of network states and sub-states
example, in a voice application the number of states are dictated by the lev-
els of service oﬀered. Secondly, in order to provide a second coarser level
of granularity, we divide the operational and the service space of the net-
work in to regions based on network design and application supported, as
discussed in Section 4.3.1. This further simplifies the analysis because of the
limited number of regions. Further details on regions along with examples
are presented in Section 4.3.
This approach of characterizing networks based on the fundamental net-
work properties and expected performance can be used in diﬀerent network
research areas such as network resilience, adaptive routing, design and eval-
uation of security solutions.
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4.2.4 Projected State Space
The operational state space NS and the service state space PS are both
multivariate. As shown in Example 1, each element of the operational state
space is a set with ￿ elements. Similarly, each element of the service state
space is also a set with ￿ elements. In order to visualize this state space on a
two dimensional state space, we project both the operational state space and
service state space on to one dimension. This projection is achieved via an
objective function that is applied in the both the state spaces. This is only
possible if all operational metrics Ni and service parameters Pi are numeric
and ordered.
Let N ∗S be the projected operational state space of the original state space
NS . This is achieved via an objective function f such that NS∗ = f(×iNi).
This means that for each set in the NS , we apply a objective function on
its ￿ member elements. This objective function may be a linear combination
with normalized weights or logical functions (e.g., AND, OR).
Similarly let PS∗ be the projected service state space of the original service
state space PS . This is achieved via an objective function f such that PS∗ =
f(×iPi). Therefore, for each set in the PS , we apply a objective function on
its ￿ member elements. This objective function could be a linear combination
with normalized weights or logical functions (e.g., AND, OR).
In the case of numeric, ordered, and continuous operational metrics and
service parameters, the individual operational Ni and service Pi states with
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the range of their respective members. When these are projected over two
dimension, we represent them as N∗i = f(Ni) and P∗i = f(Pi). When states
are defined over the projected operational and service states, we can represent
these states on a piece-wise linear axis.
—————————————————————————————————
Example 3: Lets consider the example that we have been building
throughout this section. So far, we have defined the operational state
space NS and the service state space PS for a given system S. The
operational state is defined as:
N1 = {n1,1, n1,2, n1,3}
N2 = {n2,1, n2,2, n2,3}
NS = {(n1,1, n2,1), (n1,1, n2,2), (n1,1, n2,3), (n1,2, n2,1), (n1,2, n2,2),
(n1,2, n2,3), (n1,3, n2,1), (n1,3, n2,2), (n1,3, n2,3)}
P1 = {p1,1, p1,2, p1,3}
P2 = {p2,1, p2,2, p2,3}
PS = {(p1,1, p2,1), (p1,1, p2,2), (p1,1, p2,3), (p1,2, p2,1), (p1,2, p2,2),
(p1,2, p2,3), (p1,3, p2,1), (p1,3, p2,2), (p1,3, p2,3)}
In order to project these multivariate spaces on to a two dimensional
plot, we apply a objective function to obtain N∗S and N
∗
S . Suppose the
objective function is a linear combination of the operational metrics
and service parameters:
f = αy1 + (1− α)y2
NS∗ = f(NS) = {(αn1,1 + (1− α)n2,1), (αn1,1 + (1− α)n2,2), . . .}
PS∗ = f(PS) = {(βn1,1 + (1− β)n2,1), (βn1,1 + (1− β)n2,2), . . .}
Now both NS∗ and PS∗ are uni-dimensional and can be represented on
two dimensional state space plots. Furthermore, the individual states
can be defined as a subset of these new projected state space instead
of the original state space.
—————————————————————————————————
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4.2.5 State Transitions
There are two types of network transitions: sub-state transitions and state
transitions. The stimuli that triggers these transitions include normal op-
erational conditions such as traﬃc dynamics as well as various challenges
and attacks (Section 1.1). The sub-state transitions reflect the instanta-
neous changes (of lesser magnitude) in the operational metrics with time due
to dynamic nature of the network and traﬃc, especially in large networks.
These transients sub-states are represented as internal points with in a state,
as shown in Figure 4.3.
Sub-state transitions aside, as long as the operational metrics and service
parameters do not violate the state boundaries, the network remains in its
current state and only sub-state transitions are possible. However, events
of large magnitude (often due to an external challenge or attack) result in
state transitions. The range of operational metrics and service parameters
for a given state is determined by the specific scenario. For example, a voice
application may require two states based on the service metric – end-to-end
delay: one state in which the delay is less than 200 msec and the other state
for delays greater than 200 msec. On the other hand, data applications may
require more number of states to diﬀerentiate service requirements of HTTP,
P2P, and FTP traﬃc. The boundaries of each of the states and the number
of states are both determined by the application being supported and the
expected service.
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Note that the sub-state transitions do not impact the resilience evaluations
directly. Hence in the remainder of this dissertation we focus on state tran-
sitions alone.
4.3 Resilience Evaluation
In this section, we present a generic framework to evaluate the network re-
silience by tracing the movement of the network through various states.
4.3.1 Resilience State Space
Given that the network is characterized with network states and state tran-
sitions, we now consider the following two questions: How do we evaluate
resilience and what should be the resolution between states? We propose
a new approach to limit the number of states as well as facilitate an easy
evaluation of resilience. We propose that the operational and service space
of the network be divided into regions. The operational space of the net-
work is divided into ro regions based on the physical infrastructure and rs
regions based on the application and end user requirements. We present this
approach with a simple case where ro = rs = 3.
We divide the operating region of the network in to three regions: normal
operating, partially degraded, and severely degraded. Similarly, the per-
formance of the network is also classified in to three regions: acceptable,
impaired, and unacceptable. The stimuli, in this case, are various adverse
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conditions discussed in Section 1. Note that there may be more than one
state in each region. Let us consider the transition of the network between
diﬀerent states as shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Network states in the given operating region
Let the current state of the network be S0 as shown in Figure 4.4. Following
the occurrence of an adverse event, the network stays in its current state if
the change in the ith metric, ni0, does not exceed the allowed range [ni0, ni0]
and the service parameters remain with in limits [p
j0
, pj0]. If an adverse
event does result in one or more metrics exceeding their range in the current
state, the network proceeds to a diﬀerent state. Assume that following an
adverse event, the network moves to state S1 in which service parameters
are in the limits [p
j1
, pj1]. The network may be engineered so that for a
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given application, both S0 and S1 lie in the normal operating region, in
which the service is acceptable. On the other hand, adverse events of greater
impact may drive the network to a state S2 in the partially degraded region
with impaired service, or to a state S3 in severely degraded region with
unacceptable service parameters. The range of network operational metrics
for which the network will remain in each state is clearly quantified along
with the expected service in that state. The unique advantage of this method
is that it results in manageable number of states.
In summary, there are two potential issues with this approach: (1) the num-
ber of metrics in each dimension may be very large and (2) there may be state
explosion due to the number of quantifiable network states can be avoided in
this context. First, the number of metrics can be limited to those that aﬀect
the service under consideration. Secondly, the number of states are limited
by the granularity of the service diﬀerentiation required as illustrated above.
Finally, all transients in network operation (originating from network dy-
namics) that result in a predetermined service level are aggregated into one
state. This approach significantly reduces the number of states.
4.3.2 Eﬀects of Security Mechanisms on State Space
Security plays a very important role in the overall resilience of the network.
We propose to map various security aspects of end-to-end applications on the
state space of the network. The threats that eﬀect the physical state of the
network, such as jamming, hijacking, or corrupting a node can be captured
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in the operational metrics. On the other hand, data confidentiality and
integrity are treated as service requirements that are quantified using service
parameters. Separating the operational and service aspects of security has
the added benefit of reducing the cost since service requirements can be met
on a per application basis. For example, a bank transaction may require data
confidentiality that is provided at increased cost by encryption, whereas a
news feed with open access can be serviced at lower costs.
Detecting attacks using the state space: Consider an instant of time
when the expected operational metrics belong to a state Sk, N(t) ∈ Sk.
However, the observed performance expressed in service parameters does not
belong to state k, P(t) /∈ Sk. Assuming the correctness of measurements, this
is an indication of a hidden malicious attack. Furthermore, the degradation
in the network due to the attack can be evaluated from the state in which
the observed service parameters are placed.
For example, using our formulation, the RoQ attacks can be modeled as
changes in the traﬃc distribution, resulting in reduced performance. When
an RoQ attack occurs, the observable traﬃc load places the network in state
S1 in the normal region, however, the observed service parameters place
the network in a diﬀerent state S2 in the impaired or unacceptable region.
Mathematically, N(t) ∈ S1 but P(t) ∈ S2 and since S1 ￿= S2, an attack
is detected. In summary, since the expected service under various network
conditions is quantified, an anomaly in the service is immediately visible.
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4.3.3 Resilience Measure
Given the formulation discussed in the above section, we now establish a
measure of resilience. In this framework, resilience is the ability to stay in the
acceptable service region or degrade gracefully under the presence of attacks.
Resilient networks remain either in the acceptable service region or move
slowly in to the impaired region with increasing degradation in the network.
Furthermore, two applications with diﬀerent service requirements may follow
two completely diﬀerent trajectories through the state space. For example
in the Figure 4.5, a resilient application X may follow the state trajectory
S0 → S1 → S2 → S3, whereas another resource intensive application Y may
follow the state trajectory S ￿0 → S ￿1 → S ￿2 → S ￿3.
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Figure 4.5: State trajectory of two applications
70
As is evident from the figure, application Y deteriorates faster than appli-
cation X when the network degrades. Observe that this method provides
the knowledge of system behavior under attacks before hand. This is not
achieved by an exhaustive analysis of all the possible attacks, but rather by
analyzing the manifestation of such attacks in network characteristics (oper-
ational metrics) and service parameters.
4.3.4 Steady State versus Transient Analysis
The proposed methodology supports both steady state analysis and transient
analysis. In the steady-state analysis we evaluate the long term view of the
network resilience by conducting either theoretical calculations or network
simulations to understand the impact of perturbations in the operational
state (due to challenges and attacks) on the service parameters. This leads to
best, worst, and average case resilience measures. In the transient analysis,
we observe the instantaneous state of the network and evaluate the state
transitions in real time as the network challenges are countered by detection,
defense, remediation, and recovery mechanisms. In this case, resilience is
characterized by state transitions occuring in real time.
4.4 Methodology
In this section, we present the methodology to evaluate resilience of net-
works using the metrics framework presented in the previous sections. First,
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we show a step-by-step method to build the state-space using a numerical ex-
ample. Secondly, we show how the framework applies to multilevel resilience.
4.4.1 Building the State-Space
In this section, we evaluate a specific scenario to demonstrate the steps in-
volved in building the two-dimensional state-space using the proposed frame-
work. Consider a generic wireless metropolitan area network consisting of
a number of mobile wireless nodes uniformly distributed. Some modes are
information sources (servers) and others are information sinks (clients). For
instance, servers may have access to the Internet and other mobile nodes
access the Web through the server nodes. The wireless client nodes also com-
municate amongst themselves (analogous to ad-hoc mode in 802.11). Our
objective is to build the state-space at the application layer, meaning that
we are interested in the overall resilience of the network when subject to a
specific set of challenges.
Step 1: Characterize the network operational condition:
The first step is to characterize the network using operational metrics. The
set of metrics used depend on the specific challenge being considered. In this
example, we evaluate the impact of traﬃc and degree of network connectivity
on the delivered service. For simplicity we consider the following two opera-
tional metrics for this scenario, assuming that the other metrics remain at a
constant value:
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n1 = traﬃc load normalized to ρ0
n2 = average node degree
The normalized traﬃc is used as a metric to characterize the traﬃc on the
network, given that 0.75ρ0 is the normal load for which the network is engi-
neered. For simplicity, the burstiness of the traﬃc is ignored in this example.
Node degree is used as a metric to quantify the connectivity of the network.
Hence the operational state is represented as: N = {N1, N2} where N1, N2
are a set of values of n1 and n2 respectively.
Note that in this example we are not considering the numerous other opera-
tional metrics from all the layers between physical layer and application layer.
The resilience analysis across multiple layers is presented in Section 4.4.2
Step 2: Characterize the service:
Service is characterized based on the application and the performance param-
eters of interest. Consider an interactive application such as Web browsing
where the objective of the user is to retrieve a web page. Again, we consider
two specific service metrics to specify user requirements.
p1 = response time expressed as: 2× end-to-end delay
p2 = service availability expressed as connection success rate (CSR)
The response time determines the time user has to wait for a response in cases
where the service is available and the number of failed connection attempts
characterizes the service availability. Hence the service state is represented
as: P = {P1, P2} where P1, P2 are a set of values of p1 and p2 respectively.
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Assumptions: In order to simplify the example scenario, we make the fol-
lowing non-realistic assumption. The objective of this example is to demon-
strate the use of framework for hypothetical network scenario with two op-
erational metrics and two service parameters:
• the dominant factor in the end-to-end delay is the queuing time assum-
ing the transmission, propagation, and processing time to be negligible
• other operational conditions of the network remain constant and do
not impact the variations in the service parameters
Step 3: Observable network states:
Given that the operational condition of the network and the expected service
of the network is characterizes, we can now define the state as:
S = (N,P) where
N = {N1, N2} and
P = {P1, P2}.
We make a simplifying assumption that the user is interested in five net-
work states (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5). This implies that we evaluate the resilience
of the network in terms of its state transitions between these five states.
The corresponding operational metrics and service parameters are given in
Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Example of network states
State Operational Metrics Service Parameters
Sk traﬃc load node degree response time success %
N1k N2k P1k P2k
n1k n1k n2k n2k p1k p1k p2k p2k
k = 1 0 0.5ρ0 5 6 0 0.5 0.95 1
k = 2 0.5ρ0 0.75ρ0 6 8 0 1 0.90 0.95
k = 3 0 0.6ρ0 3 5 1 5 0.75 0.85
k = 4 0.75ρ0 0.85ρ0 5 7 5 10 0.75 0.80
k = 5 0 0.6ρ0 0 3 0 1 0.5 0.6
Step 4: Formulate the state-space:
Given the application and the observed states, the next step involves devel-
oping the state-space diagram of the network. In order to further simplify
the resilience analysis, we divide the operational space and service space in
to smaller regions. In this particular example, we divide the operational
space and service space in to three regions each based on the design of the
network and user expectations of the service provided. For the interactive
application, currently under consideration, Table 4.2 shows the classification
of regions in service space.
The boundaries of the service regions are based on the generic utility curve
for interactive applications [51]. The user does not perceive a change if the
response time is less than 300 ms and delays up to 1 s are barely notice-
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Table 4.2: Regions of service space
Region Service Parameters
response time p1 % successful attempts p1
Acceptable p1 ≤ 1 s p2 ≥ 0.90
Impaired 1 < p1 ≤ 10 s p2 ≥ 0.75
Unacceptable p1 > 10 s p2 < 0.75
Table 4.3: Regions of operational space
Region Operational metrics
traﬃc load n1 avg. node degree n1
Normal n1 ≤ 0.75ρ0 n2 ≥ 5
Partially degraded 0.75ρ0 < n1 ≤ 0.9ρ0 n2 ≥ 3
Severely degraded n1 > 0.9ρ0 n2 < 3
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able. Hence, for the application under consideration, the acceptable region
of performance extends for all sub-second response times. The user begins
to notice a delay in system response starting from 1 s up to 10 s. This is
classified as impaired performance. For delays beyond 10 s, the user gives up
and the service is unacceptable. The boundary conditions for second service
parameters, i.e. percentage of successful connection attempts, are derived
arbitrarily for this example.
Similarly, the operational space is divided in to 3 regions as shown in Ta-
ble 4.3. The boundaries for each of the region is determined by the original
design of the network. In this particular example, the network is engineered
for optimal performance under a traﬃc load of ρ0. Furthermore, based on the
steady state mobility patterns the network is expected to have an minimum
node degree of 3.
Step 5: Assign observed/derived states to respective regions:
In the final step, we assign the available states (observed or derived) to the
regions of the state-space. For a state to be present in a given operational
or service region, it must satisfy all the constraints of the regions as given
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Furthermore, if a given network state satisfies the
constraints of more than one region, it is placed in the best region. Matching
the states in Table 4.1 with the region constraints of Tables 4.2 and 4.3,
we obtain the state-space diagram shown in Figure 4.6. Thus, we obtain the
state-space formulation for a given resilience scenarios. Note that in this case,
the objective functions N ∗S are the logical AND of the individual metrics.
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Figure 4.6: Final state-space diagram for example 3.1
In this example, we demonstrated the methodology to derive the state-space
at a given level. The application of this methodology over multiple levels
follows.
4.4.2 Multilevel Resilience Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the multilevel aspect of the metrics framework.
Furthermore, we use a mobile adhoc network (MANET) example to demon-
strate how resilience propagates across layer boundaries.
The multilevel principle [P8] of ResiliNets architecture suggests that re-
silience be addressed at all levels, in the sense that each layer does the
best it can, given practical constraints. These constraints are often based
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on the cost of resilience. Therefore, resilience must be analyzed at each layer
individually as well as for the network as a whole. For this purpose, the met-
rics framework supports multilevel resilience evaluation. Formally, resilience
Rij is defined at the boundary Bij between any two adjacent layers Li, Lj.
Based on the formulation of Section 4.2, let there be a set of k operational
metrics N = {N1, N2, . . . , Nk} that characterize the state of the network be-
low the boundary Bij,. Similarly, let there be a set of l service parameters
P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pl} that characterize the service from layer i to layer j.
Resilience Rij at the boundary Bij is then evaluated as the transition of the
network through this state space. The goal is to derive the Rij as a function
of N and P. In the simplest case Rij is the area under the curve obtained
by plotting P vs. N on a multivariate piecewise axis. We will revisit the
calculation of Rij based on a given set of state transitions in Chapter 5.
In the multilevel analysis, the service parameters at the boundary Bij become
the operation metrics at boundary Bi+1,j+1. In other words, the service
provided by a given layer becomes the operational state of the layer above,
which has a new set of service parameters characterizing its service to the
layer above. This process is shown in Figure 4.7.
We model diﬀerent options at all layers under consideration, e.g., topology,
routing and transport. In this process, we will evaluate how a specific mech-
anism at a given layer (say path routing) performs by using a fixed standard
setting at all other levels. In other words, we isolate the resilience of each
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Figure 4.7: Resilience across multiple levels
layer and evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the resilience mechanisms and princi-
ples discussed in Chapter 3.
MANET Example
In this section, we evaluate a mobile ad hoc network with the objective of
characterizing the network at each layer from bottom up. In this example, we
will consider which metrics can be used at each layer and how they propagate
upwards. Figure 4.8 shows the operational metrics and service parameters
at each layer boundary. Note that these levels do not directly correspond to
OSI layers.
At the lowest boundary B1,2 between the physical and the link+MAC layer,
the operational metrics are the radio characteristics, the transmit power, and
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Figure 4.8: Multilevel resilience evaluation of a MANET
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channel conditions. The service provided across this boundary (from physi-
cal layer to the link+MAC) is a communication channel which is measured
by the baud rate, BER, and the transmit range. Therefore, N1 = {tx-power,
propagation loss, node distance} and P2={baud rate, BER, transmit range}.
We evaluate the resilience the physical layer by measuring these service pa-
rameters (representing the quality of the channel) under the presence of per-
turbations to the operational conditions. For example, if a challenge such as
a weather storm were to increase the propagation losses of a millimeter-wave
network, the ability of the radio to overcome this increased losses determines
its resilience. Therefore R1,2 = f(N1,P2). In an ideal (but impractical) case,
the radio would be able to survive this challenge without aﬀecting the service
being provided.
At the boundary B2,3t we can evaluate the resilience of the link+MAC proto-
col. In this case the service parameters from lower boundary B1,2 become the
operational metrics. In addition, other factors that are included in the oper-
ational state of the network at this boundary are the node density and flow
rates because both of those parameters aﬀect the performance of 802.11 MAC
algorithm. The service provided across this boundary is links. Hence, N2 =
{P2, node density, flow rate} and P3t={link capacity, FER}. The resilience
at this level is evaluated as the ability of the link+MAC protocol to provide
stable, high capacity, and low error links in the presence of perturbations to
the its operational metrics, i.e. R2,3t = f(N2,P3t).
At the next boundary B3t,3r, we evaluate the resilience of the topology sub
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layer. Note that we divide the traditional network layer into a topology
(3t) and path routing (3r)sub-layers so as to isolate the resilience of a given
topology from the ability of the routing protocol to find paths over that
topology. At this level, the service parameters from the level below become
the operational metrics for this level. Furthermore, the mobility is another
metric that gets added to the operational state at this level. Assuming a fixed
mobility model, we only consider the node speed in this example. Here we
define N3t = {P3t, node speed}. The service provided by this sub-layer is the
topology, therefore, the service metrics relate to quantifying certain aspect
of the network topology. In this example we choose three such parameters:
partitions, average link duration, and link costs. Hence, P3rr={partitions,
avg. link durations, link costs}. Resilience is then the ability of this layer to
provide connected topologies in the presence of perturbations to the links.
At the boundary B3r,4, we measure the resilience of the routing protocol.
In this case the operational conditions consists of the service parameters
from the layer below and the service being provided is paths. The op-
erational metrics are simply the service parameters from the layer below.
N3r=P3t={partitions, avg. link durations, link costs}. The service parame-
ters reflect the ability of the routing to find optimal paths given a topology,
P4={% reachable pairs, path latency, and path FER}. The resilience at this
level is the ability of the network to find optimal paths in the presence of
perturbations to the underlying topology, R3r,4 = f(N3r,P4).
Going a level above, at the B4,7 we evaluate the resilience of the transport
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protocol under the presence of challenges. Note that we are ignoring the
session (5) and presentation (6) layers. Mapping the service parameters
from the level below, we arrive at the operational metrics at this boundary,
N4=P3r={% reachable pairs, path latency, and path FER}. The service
provided by the transport is end-to-end data transfer. In order to measure
this service, we define two metrics: P4={throughput, end-to-end delay}.
Lastly, at the boundary B7,8 we evaluate the resilience of the application (e.g.
HTTP, FTP). For the sake of generality, we are representing the end user
as layer 8. The operational metrics as derived from the service parameters
from layer below are: N7=P4={throughput, end-to-end delay}. The service
provided by the application is simply measured as its performance to the user.
In this example we define two service parameters: P7={goodput, percentage
of completed flows or transactions}. Hence resilience at this boundary is
evaluated as the ability to provide acceptable performance in the presence of
perturbations to the service provided by the transport layer.
Thus, the proposed framework can evaluate the resilience of a network at each
level, thereby providing a means to evaluate the multilevel resilience principle
of the ResiliNets architecture. Furthermore, it allows us to determine the
weakest link in the protocol stack from a resilience perspective. Finally, it is
also possible to evaluate the resilience between any two arbitrary boundaries
Bij where j > i and j ￿= i + 1. This is especially useful in simulation based
studies in which the simulation model may abstract certain levels. We have
84
conducted simulation studies to evaluate the resilience of the MANET at
several boundaries. These results are presented later Chapter 5.
4.5 Metrics in ResiliNets Architecture
In this section, we present how the metrics framework fits in the overall
resilience architecture. Furthermore, we also discuss how various resilience
strategies and mechanisms influence the evaluation of resilience using the
proposed framework. Figure 4.9 shows an integrated view of the network
behavior at any abstraction level (layer).
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Figure 4.9: Instrumenting resilience using proposed framework
This block diagram shows how the errors develop in a network and how they
aﬀect the service being delivered with respect to the D2R2 + DR strategy.
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The first section of the block diagram is reproduced for clarity in Figure 4.10
and shows the evolution of the errors as explained below.
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of errors in communication systems
As discussed in Chapter 3, dormant faults are inherent to all systems. Careful
network design can eliminate faults to some extent. However, it is not possi-
ble to build absolutely fault free systems. This (dormant fault) vulnerability
in the system is exploited by adverse events such as malicious attacks and
environmental challenges in the absence of defense mechanisms to cause (trig-
ger) external faults. On the other hand, internal faults are caused by those
dormant faults that are triggered merely by system operation (for example
execution of buggy code). Both internal and external faults are called active
faults [15]. Active faults cause errors that if not detected and corrected or
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compensated directly aﬀect the operational state of the network. The process
by which such errors aﬀect the system is reproduced in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: Eﬀect of errors on the communication systems
The extent to which the network degrades depends on the severity of the
error and the design of the system. Note that this degradation of the oper-
ational state is captured by operational metrics in the proposed framework.
The eﬀect of the network degradation on the users is determined by the re-
silience of the service and is captured by service parameters in our framework.
Depending upon the extent of resiliency, the service parameters may either
remain acceptable or degrade to some lower value. If the service does de-
grade, the remediation and recovery mechanisms detect this degradation in
network state and repair the network leading to improvement in the services.
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Example 3.2: An example of these relationships for the physical layer is
shown in Figure 4.12. It is seen that for every service interface, it is possible
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Figure 4.12: Example of resilience at physical layer
to identify the elements leading to errors. Also, the eﬀect of these errors on
the operational space and subsequently on the service can also be determined
if the rate of errors and service resilience is known. We could then use the
proposed framework to analyze the state-space of the network and derive re-
silience functions. Referring back to the Figure 4.4, the state transition from
S1 to S2 shows a degradation in the operational condition of the network that
leads to impaired service. On the other hand, the state transition from S4 to
S5 shows the recovery by the network from impaired service to acceptable.
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4.5.1 Resilience Strategy Revisited
Figure 4.9 shows the relationship of the D2R2+DR strategy to the 2- dimen-
sional state space. The left part shows the fault → error → failure chain
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Figure 4.13: Resilience strategy evaluation using metrics framework
with the defense resisting the activation of faults and propagation of errors
to service failures. Challenges and errors can be detected to initiate remedi-
ation. The right side of the Figure shows the operational dimension N and
service dimension P as ranges that are degraded when errors propagate to
operational state and when the eﬀects of the operational state impact the
service state (S0 → Sc trajectory in Figure 4.13). Remediation mechanisms
help drive the operational state towards improvement, and service resilience
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resists the eﬀects of degraded operational state from impairing the service
(Sc → Sr trajectory). Recovery moves the operational state back to normal
operation at the end of the inner strategy loop. Diagnosis and refinement
are the outer loop, used to improve this entire process.
In summary, an analysis of the process by which errors are produced will
provide a quantitative measure of how often and to what extent will the
operational state of the network degrade. Also, the proposed state-space
framework provides a clear idea of the service behavior for diﬀerent regions
of the operational space. By combining the evaluation of errors with the pro-
posed framework, it is possible to determine steady state resilience function
of the system at any service interface.
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Chapter 5
Network Topology Resilience
In this chapter, we present resilience evaluation of network topologies us-
ing the metrics framework proposed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, we present
mechanisms to improve the resilience of the network at the topology and
routing sub-layers. Since the resilience of a network depends strongly on
the actual physical topology, we need to generate realistic physical topolo-
gies. Hence we first introduce a realistic topology model based on location
and cost constraints. Secondly, we apply the proposed metrics framework to
evaluate the resilience of the generated topologies. Simulations are conducted
to evaluate the resilience of topologies in the presence of link failures. One of
the resilience measures against link failures is to use path redundancy and di-
versity as suggested by principles P11 and P12 of the ResiliNets architecture
in Chapter 3. Therefore, using the proposed metrics framework, we evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of one such mechanism [52] that exploits path-diversity to
improve the resilience of the network against link and node failures.
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: first, we present a realistic
physical topology generation model in Section 5.1 followed by resilience eval-
uation of various topologies in Section 5.2. Lastly, we present the resilience
analysis of a multi-path routing protocol in the presence of link failures in
Section 5.3.
5.1 Generating Physical Topologies
Realistic network topology models are crucial for network research and are
commonly used for the analysis, simulation, and evaluation of various mech-
anisms and protocols. The vast majority of work from this perspective is
aimed at recreating router- or AS-level graphs that are representative of the
inferred Internet topology. In this section, we consider network topology
models in the context of physical topologies. In order to evaluate the re-
silience and survivability of networks, it is necessary to generate realistic
physical topologies that are governed by the infrastructure as opposed to
only logical topologies that are governed by policy or higher-layer abstrac-
tions. We argue that the dominant factor that influences the actual physical
topologies is the geographic node location and distribution, which in turn
is based on population distribution. Hence we explore location and cost
constraints to generate realistic physical topologies. Furthermore, given the
tiered nature of real networks and the diversity of topology at each tier, we
propose the use of hierarchical models that utilize distinct graph generation
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methods at each level. Based on these principles, we present a generation
model and discuss the resulting topologies.
5.1.1 Logical versus Physical topologies
The majority of the existing body of research is based on logical topol-
ogy models focusing on the generation of either router-level [53] or AS-level
topologies [53, 54]. In the router-level graph, each router is represented as a
vertex and a logical (IP) link between a pair of routers that forms the edge
between the vertices. However, an edge between a pair of vertices does not
necessarily imply a direct physical link without any intermediary lower layer
nodes. In an AS-level topology, each AS (autonomous system) is represented
as a single node and the BGP (border gateway protocol) connectivity between
the ASes represents the graph edge connectivity. Hence, neither the router-
level nor the AS-level graph represents the actual physical connection between
nodes. Layer 3 links are logical connections consisting of multiple physical
links between Layer 2 and layer 1 components such as switches, multiplexers,
regenerators, and optical amplifiers. Furthermore, Layer 3 topologies are fre-
quently not representative of the underlying infrastructure due to Layer 2.5
technologies such as MPLS, SONET, and Metro Ethernet that permit dy-
namic rearrangement of paths for traﬃc engineering, policy, and restoration.
Thus it is possible for two distinct IP paths to share the same link, making
it diﬃcult to understand and engineer the resilience of the network by as-
suming that IP links correspond to physical links. If we do not understand
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the geographic location of physical network nodes and links we do not know
if they share fate, as was the case in the Baltimore tunnel fire [55] in which
many logically distinct links failed at the same time.
Recently, there has been increased interest in the resilience and survivability
aspects of communication networks. All currently evolving networks consider
survivability in network planning and design phase to some extent. Various
studies on future networks [56, 57] place tremendous emphasis on the re-
silience and survivability of the networks. For example, one of the goals of
the Future Internet Design (FIND) [58] Postmodern Internetwork Architec-
ture [59] project is to design networks with high availability. In this case,
it is not good enough to merely look at logical topologies, because IP-level
connectivity while being fundamental to numerous aspects of the network is
not fundamental to the survivability of the network. In other words, while
logical topologies are valuable from the protocol perspective, they do not
form a very good basis for resilience evaluation in the presence of physical
challenges to the network. Furthermore, evaluating resilience from a service
perspective requires an end-to-end network model considering the end-hosts
as opposed to just the core network.
Realistic physical topology models and generators are required to permit rig-
orous resilience studies including formal analysis, detailed simulations, and
experimentation. This process is a step further from the use of simplistic
graph properties such as clustering coeﬃcient and betweenness as an ap-
proximate measure of resilience.
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5.1.2 Approach
The main thrust of this work is to model and generate realistic physical-layer
topologies. Therefore, the generation model should be representative of the
actual network structure and evolution process. Some of the well known, yet
fundamental aspects of real physical topologies are: a) hierarchical nature
with significantly varying structure at each level, b) modular with level-
specific graphs, and c) location and cost constrained.
We propose a generation model that is hierarchical with n-levels [60]. Fur-
thermore, the graph models used at each level diﬀer significantly. In other
words, there is not a single overarching graph model that can generate realis-
tic graphs at each level. Instead the graph models used at each level vary from
closed form general-purpose models (e.g. Waxman [61]) to pre-structured
subgraphs (e.g. trees, rings). It is known that the physical topology of real
networks is highly structured and follows to a large extent the population dis-
tribution. So instead of using random node positioning, we use well-defined
geographic models for node positioning at each level. These range from using
exact geocoordinates from known existing networks1 to probabilistic distri-
butions (e.g. heavy tailed). Lastly, real physical topologies, especially at the
backbone level, are highly cost constrained. High resilience can be achieved
at unacceptably high costs, however unrealistic. If this were the case, net-
1While it is very diﬃcult to infer data on the physical links of existing networks, the
node locations, often coinciding with major population and commercial hubs, are easier
to obtain.
95
works would be full meshes. Hence realistic generators must have the ability
to produce feasible topologies at finite cost.
In this section, we present a synthesis of principles on which real networks
are designed and apply then to topology generation. Furthermore, we dis-
cuss their implementation in a sample model followed by the analysis of the
proposed model.
Hierarchy
Hierarchical models were studied very early on in the context of logical
topologies (router-level and AS-level). It has been observed that Internet
exhibits loose hierarchy [62,63]. We now revisit the hierarchy in the context
of physical network topology. Based on real networks, the proposed model
is hierarchical and this hierarchy permeates through various aspects of the
generator – from the graph models, to design constraints, to optimizations
desired, to location and cost constraints.
However, we note that when compared to the usage of hierarchy in logical
topologies, there is a fundamental diﬀerence in which we apply hierarchy to
physical layer topology. Hierarchy in the proposed approach is not limited to
the way it shapes the connectivity between diﬀerent levels, but also enables
the use of distinct graph evolution mechanisms at each level independently
as well as for diﬀerent parts of a given level, e.g. separate access networks.
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Level-Specific Models
Real networks tend to be modular, i.e. diﬀerent levels of hierarchy in the
network use diﬀerent graph models. For example, while backbone topologies
are tend to be generally connected in a mesh or mesh-like graph [64], access
networks on the other hand tend to use ring, star, and tree-like graphs. Lastly
subscriber networks are connected directly to the access networks [64] forming
a star like topology. Hence, we use level-specific graph generation models for
each level of the hierarchy. Furthermore, some levels of the network use a
set of discrete pre-structured graphs instead of a single homogenous graph
model, in particular access networks are modeled using a combination of ring
(e.g. SONET), tree (e.g. HFC – hybrid fiber coax), and mesh.
Location Constraints
The physical topology of networks is highly constrained by the geographic lo-
cation of its components. Several works in the past (e.g. [65,66]) have shown
that the router-level topology shows a very high correlation to the popula-
tion density. Moreover, the probability of links is strongly related to the
distance between the nodes. It has been shown that the geographic distance-
based models such as Waxman accurately model the link distribution when
considering location constraints [65]. However, we are not aware of any ex-
isting models that apply these fundamental principles to physical network
topologies. We consider both the absolute distribution of the nodes as relat-
ing to population density and the distribution of nodes with respect to each
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other. The use of a hierarchical model enables us to achieve this by defining
a separate growth model for each level. While the position and distribu-
tion of the level-1, also known as backbone PoPs (point of presence), nodes
is based on the population distribution (or other location constraints such
as existing PoP locations in a given region or presence of NAPs – network
access points), the distribution of the access networks and access network
nodes requires further research to determine the distributions that model it
accurately.
We generate level-1 node locations based on the population distribution of
the United States and compared it with the existing ISP node locations.
Figure 5.1 shows a map of 104 nodes generated by finding clustering points
on the US population dataset. This map also shows the actual PoP locations
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Figure 5.1: Comparing population based and real PoP locations
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for four major US ISPs (Sprint, Level 3, and AT&T) from the Rocketfuel
database [67]. In order to compare the error between the points generated
purely based on population clusters and the known locations, we show the
CCDF (complementary cumulative distribution function) of the error (oﬀset
distance) in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Oﬀset distance between real and generated node locations
The oﬀset distance is defined as the absolute distance between a generated
point and the closest real PoP. The oﬀset distance is plotted when comparing
the points against a particular ISP network as well as against the combined
PoPs of all three networks. The most meaningful conclusions can be derived
when comparing the node locations generated using the population dataset
against the combined PoP locations of all networks. In this case, we observe
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that 98% of nodes generated by KU-LocGen are accurate within an oﬀset
distance of 60 km.
Cost Constraints
Cost constraints significantly impact practical network design and evolution.
Economic factors shape physical level infrastructure [68]. The resilience and
survivability of networks is almost always limited by the cost, therefore, re-
alistic models must incorporate cost constraints. However, this poses a sig-
nificant challenge due to the lack of standard cost functions for network
infrastructure. Furthermore, the cost function is not only location and time
dependent, but also depends on the level within the network hierarchy. Given
the impracticability of a universal cost function, we propose the use of mod-
ular cost functions: the model should support multiple cost functions that
are highly tunable and allow network designers to select as well as define
new cost functions based on fundamental variables such as fixed and variable
costs per link and per node. We present one such model in our preliminary
implementation.
5.1.3 Generation Model
In this section, we present a 3-level hierarchical model. These hierarchical
levels represent the backbone, access, and subscriber networks whose ge-
ographic distribution is represented by Ψp, Ψn, Ψs respectively. Further-
more, the number and geographic spread of nodes at any given level is
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strongly correlated to the higher level nodes in the hierarchy as discussed
below. The backbone node (level-1) distribution model Ψp supports three
diﬀerent location constraints including fixed geographic positions based on
known point-of-presence locations (of existing networks), user defined, and
a random distribution as discussed below. The number of level-2 access net-
works N(i) are chosen based on a uniformly distributed random variable.
N = U(nmin, nmax), where nmin and nmax are the lower and upper limits on
the number of access networks per backbone node. The N(i) access net-
works are distributed around a given PoP using a gaussian distribution, thus
Ψn = N [µn, σ2n], where µn represents the PoP location and σ
2
n is the vari-
ance. The subscriber networks are distributed normally Ψs = N [µs, σ2s ],
where µs represents the access network location and σ2n is the variance. Ob-
viously, the variance determines the geographical extent and the spread of
the subscribers. Additionally, the variance of each access network may vary
according to the size and location of the access network as well as the PoP
to which the access network is connected: σ2s(i) ∝ 1N(i)
The number of access nodes M(i) in the ith access network of the jth back-
bone node is based on the distance of the access network from the back-
bone node relative to the other access networks connected to the same
backbone node. The number of nodes in the access network is given as
M(i) = max(dt);t=1,2,...N(j)di ×Mmin, where di is the distance of the ith access net-
work and Mmin is the minimum number of access networks defined per PoP.
FurthermoreM(i) is also the upper bound to a predefined maximum value of
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Mmax. The access network nodes are then uniformly distributed in a circular
region of radius r around the first access node. Therefore Ψm = U(0, r). The
number of subscribers in an access network is directly proportional to the
size of the access network; S(i) = M(i)max(M(j));j=1,2,...N × Smax where Smax is the
predefined limit on the maximum number of subscribers per access network.
The location constraints are implemented at any given level using a simple
cost model based on node and link costs. For simplicity, we assume that the
cost of all nodes in the backbone network is the same Cb. The link cost Ci,j
of a link i, j is calculated as Ci,j = fi,j + vi,j × di,j where fi,j is the fixed cost
associated with link, vi,j is the variable cost per unit distance for the link and
di,j is the length of the link. For simplicity we choose vi,j = d¯× vi,j where d¯
is the average link length of the network.
The link generation is based on a number of diﬀerent models depending upon
the level of the network. The backbone nodes are connected using a cost-
constrained Waxman model. The Waxman model accurately represents the
link connectivity in backbone networks [65]2. On the other hand, the ac-
cess networks are connected using pre-structured topologies that reflect real
deployments such as ring (SONET, Metro Ethernet), tree (HFC), mesh and
star. For each access network, one of these topologies is chosen randomly. Fi-
nally, subscriber networks are connected to the geographically closest access
network node. Figure 5.3 shows the components of a hypothetical topology
2While it is generally agreed that backbone networks are mesh-like, there is some
contention as to exact relationship between link probability and its distance. While some
works claim that this is exponential [65], others claim that this is linear [66].
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and illustrating the hierarchy, location, and level-specific modeling of our
approach. For the sake of simplicity, in this example we do not consider the
individual (optical) spans that make up links. Hence, link are treated as
direct entities between PoP nodes. However, the model itself is flexible and
does not impose any limitations on the use of fiber spans.
Backbone network
Access network
Subscriber network
Figure 5.3: Illustrating the hierarchical topology model
Lastly, it should be noted that since the overall generator is modular, it al-
lows the users to implement new models to be plugged in at the appropriate
levels. The distributions and graph models used in our preliminary imple-
mentation provide an example of a typical physical network topology model.
Further research is required to determine the optimal models that would yield
highly representative plots. The tradeoﬀ between abstraction and fidelity is
supported by letting the network designer specify arbitrary detail.
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We generated several topologies based on the location constraints imposed
by existing infrastructure. For example, we used the Sprint and GE´ANT
PoP locations to constrain the distribution of the level-1 backbone nodes of
the proposed model. Figure 5.4 shows one of the sample topologies gener-
ated using the proposed model. In this Figure, the access network nodes are
aggregated for visual purpose. Figure 5.5 shows the detailed 2-level topol-
ogy along with the access network node connectivity. We point out that
visual inspection of topologies does not provide any rigorous analysis. The
purpose of these figures is to simply provide an illustration of the eﬀect of
geographic location constraints and discrete graph models. As for the degree
distributions, we observe that the degree-frequency relationship does obey
power law. However, the generated graphs do not strictly obey all power
laws in the literature.
5.2 Evaluating Network Topologies
Several measures have been proposed in the literature [69] to evaluate the
ability of the network to survive link and node failures as well as various
attacks. In this section, we apply the proposed resilience to wired network
topologies. We conduct this study at the B3t,3r boundary between the topol-
ogy sub-level (3t) and the path routing sub-level (3r). In this case, a set of
vertices V and edges E and link failures f characterize the operational state
of the network. The service across this boundary is topological connectivity.
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Figure 5.4: 2-level topology based on Sprint PoP coordinates
For the purpose of this study we selected three service provider backbone net-
work topologies, Sprint (US), AT&T (US) (Rocketfuel database [67]), and
GE´ANT2 [70]. These topologies are shown in Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 and
their statistics are shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Network statistics
Sprint AT&T GE´ANT2
nodes 27 25 34
links 136 92 102
Since we consider only link failures, we chose a single operational metric n1
to represent the number of link failures. Therefore N3r = {n1}. In order
105
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Topology of Network
Figure 5.5: 2-level topology with access networks expanded
to characterize this service, we choose two service parameters as the relative
size of the largest connected component p1 and the clustering coeﬃcient p2.
Therefore, P3t = {p1, p2}. We conducted simulations in MATLAB to evaluate
the impact of link failures on the service parameters at this boundary. We
explore the operational metric (link failure probability) over the range of
[0, 0.5] in intervals of 0.01. The simulations results are averaged over 100
runs. Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 show the impact of link failures on four
graph metrics: number of partitions, relative size of the largest connected
component, average degree, and clustering coeﬃcient for the AT&T topology.
For all plots, 95% confidence intervals of the mean are shown. As expected
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Figure 5.8: GE´ANT2 topology
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Figure 5.9: Eﬀect of link failures on AT&T partitions
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Figure 5.11: Eﬀect of link failures on AT&T partitions
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Figure 5.12: Eﬀect of link failures on AT&T partitions
almost all the metrics decline with increasing probability of link failures.
The slope of this decline varies with the metric as well as the topology being
evaluated. Though traditional metrics like these give partial insight into
the topology, in order to evaluate resilience, we need to look at a particular
service that is delivered by the network at the given level boundary. In this
example, we define the topology service by selecting two service parameters:
the relative size of the largest connected component, which represents the
reachability of the graph and clustering coeﬃcient and thus represents the
local richness of the topology. While reachability directly aﬀects the number
of pairs that are reachable, the clustering coeﬃcient aﬀects how the local
paths will be aﬀected by link failures. As an example, note that the clustering
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coeﬃcient of a grid network (manhattan grid) is zero and a single link failure
would result in significantly higher path lengths.
The regions for operational metrics (link failure probability) are defined in
Table 5.2 and service parameters are defined in Table 5.3. Note that these
are arbitrarily chosen boundaries for the purpose of analysis. However, the
bounds are kept reasonable in a general sense. Depending upon the scenario,
the framework can be used with a diﬀerent set of bounds to evaluate resilience
in that particular context.
Table 5.2: Operational regions at B3t,3r
Region Operational metrics
link failure probability n1
Normal n1 ≤ 0.01
Partially degraded 0.01 < n1 ≤ 0.20
Severely degraded n1 > 0.20
Table 5.3: Service regions at B3t,3r
Region Service Parameters
LC size p1 clustering coeﬃcient p2
Acceptable p1 = 1 p2 ≥ 0.33
Impaired 0.90 ≤ p1 < 1 0.25 ≤ p2 < 0.33
Unacceptable p1 < 0.90 p2 < 0.25
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Given these operational and service regions, we plot the simulation results on
a piece-wise linear axis. Figure 5.13 shows the steady state resilience of the
AT&T network to link failures as degradation in the service from acceptable
to unacceptable region. The region boundaries in both the operational and
service dimensions are arbitrarily chosen. The purpose of this example is
to show how the proposed metrics framework can be applied at a service
boundary given a certain set of service constraints expressed in terms of
what is acceptable, impaired, and unacceptable.
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Figure 5.13: Resilience of AT&T topology to link failures
We see that the network lies in the acceptable service region under normal
operating conditions. Given the rich connectivity of the AT&T network, the
service remains acceptable even when the network starts degrading. However,
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as the failures continue the network eventually moves to impaired service. As
the network operational conditions are severely degraded the service transi-
tions from impaired to unacceptable regions. In this example, the Sprint
network provides unacceptable service in the presence of a single link failure.
In order to get an aggregate measure of resilience, we calculate the area under
the curve formed by linear interpolation between the states. The smaller the
area, the better is the resilience; in the limiting case, if the network remains
acceptable for all operational conditions, the area under the curve will be
zero. This would represent perfect resilience. In order to get a normalized
value of resilience, we define resilience R = 1 − normalized area, where nor-
malized area is the total area divided by the span of the x-axis. For the plot
shown in Figure 5.13, R is calculated to be 0.6338. This area represents an
aggregate measure of the resilience at this boundary 3.
Figure 5.14 compares the AT&T, Sprint, and GE´ANT2 topologies. In this
case, we observe that AT&T has better resilience compared to Sprint and
GE´ANT2 topology. The resilience R for AT&T is 0.6338 and that for sprint
is 0.5410 and for GE´ANT2 is 0.4721. We observe that due to fewer number
of links, the GE´ANT2 topology has very low clustering coeﬃcient and the
topology service performs poorly even in the normal operational regions.
Next, we apply the metrics framework to the synthetic topologies generated
using the proposed generation model. We evaluate the resilience of a 104
3While this method provides a single value for resilience, it should be noted that to
gain a complete understanding of the resilience, it is necessary to inspect the state-space
plot as shown in Figure 5.13
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node level-1 topology generated using the KU-LoCGen. Figure 5.15 shows
the state space at the topology–routing boundary with varying value of a,
the link probability factor of the Waxman link generation model.
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Figure 5.14: Comparing resilience of AT&T, Sprint, and GE´ANT2
We observe that as a increases, the resilience of the network increases for a
given cost. While this particular graph is only an example, it demonstrates
how the proposed framework can be used to evaluate the impact of topology
model parameters on the resilience of the resulting graph.
5.3 Evaluating Path Routing
In this section we discuss how to evaluate the resilience of a network at the
boundary B3r,4 between topology and the transport boundary. In order to
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Figure 5.15: Resilience of topologies generated with KU-LoCGen
demonstrate the resilience at this level, we consider a multi-path routing
mechanism [52] that exploits the diversity of improve the resilience of the
paths. A brief summary of this algorithm is presented below.
5.3.1 Path Diversification
The primary motivation for path diversification mechanism is to increase
resilience by choosing paths such that they will not experience correlated
failures. For this purpose a diversity measure is defined that quantifies the
degree to which alternate paths share the same nodes and links. The defini-
tions for a path and path diversity are:
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Path: Given a (source s, destination d) node pair, a path P between them
is a vector containing all links L and all intermediate nodes N traversed by
that path:
P = L ∪N (5.1)
and the length of this path |P | is the combined total number of elements in
L and N .
Path diversity: Let the shortest path between a given (s, d) pair be P0.
Then, for any other path Pk between the same source and destination, we
define the diversity function D(x) with respect to P0 as:
D(Pk) = 1− |Pk ∩ P0||P0| (5.2)
The path diversity has a value of 1 if Pk and P0 are completely disjoint and
a value of 0 if Pk and P0 are identical. For two arbitrary paths Pa and Pb
the path diversity is given as:
D(Pb, Pa) = 1− |Pb ∩ Pa||Pa| (5.3)
where |Pa| ≤ |Pb|
The paths selection depends on the mode of operation. In this dissertation,
we evaluate the resilience of multipath routing when using k-path mode in
which the objective is to find k maximally diverse paths. We first find the
shortest fully disjoint paths, and if additional paths are required we continue
finding paths that add maximum diversity. In this mode, the multipath
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mechanism uses these paths in hot standby mode, in which if one of the
paths fail, it seamlessly switches to using the other paths associated with
the node pair. Hence a node pair is reachable as long as one of the k paths
chosen is still available.
5.3.2 Multipath Resilience
We now evaluate the resilience of this mechanism over the topologies dis-
cussed in the previous section. For this purpose, we conduct the resilience
analysis at the topology and routing sublayer boundary B3r,4. As mentioned
in the Section 4.4.2, the service parameters from the level below become the
operational metrics at the current level. In this case, the operational met-
rics N3r at boundary B3r,4 are the service parameters P3t from the resilience
boundary B3t,3r. Hence, N3r = {n1, n2} = {LC size, clustering coeﬀ.}.
Table 5.4: Operational regions at B3r,4
Region Operational Metrics
LC size n1 clustering coeﬃcient n2
Normal n1 = 1 n2 ≥ 0.33
Partially degraded 0.90 ≤ n1 < 1 0.25 ≤ n2 < 0.33
Severely degraded n1 < 0.90 n2 < 0.25
The service provided by the path routing (sub) level to the level above (trans-
port) is paths. In order to characterize this service, we define two service
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metrics: path robustness and stretch. We compute path robustness as the
number of reliable flows, divided by the total number of flows in the network.
A flow is considered reliable if at least one of its paths remains unbroken by
the link failures. Hence P4 = {p1, p2} = {path robustness, stretch}. The
normal, partially degraded, and severely degraded regions at this boundary
are given in Table 5.4. Similarly, the acceptable, impaired, and unacceptable
service regions are defined in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Service regions at B3r,4
Region Service Parameters
path robustness p1 stretch p2
Acceptable p1 ≥ 0.99 p2 ≤ 1.10
Impaired 0.75 ≤ p1 < 0.99 1.10 ≤ p2 < 1.50
Unacceptable p1 < 0.75 p2 > 1.50
Figure 5.16 shows the resilience of multi-path mechanism when using 1, 2
and 3 paths over the AT&T topology.
We observe that as the number of paths used k increase, the service remains
longer in the acceptable region and degrades more gracefully. Note that k = 1
represents unipath routing in which even a single link failure will result in
failure of certain paths even if the network is connected4. The resilience
state space plots for Sprint and GE´ANT2 networks when using multi-path
mechanism are shown in Figures 5.17 and 5.18. Note that the GE´ANT
4We are not considering active rerouting eﬀects in this example.
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Figure 5.16: Resilience of multi-path routing over AT&T topology
topology is a sparse graph with low clustering coeﬃcient and did not have
any samples in the normal operating regions with the boundaries defined in
this example.
In order to get a single measure of the resilience at this service boundary, we
show the aggregate resilience R for the three networks in Table 5.6.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we have shown how the proposed metrics framework can be
applied to evaluate the resilience of networks at multiple levels. Specifically,
we showed the evaluation of resilience at the topology–path routing bound-
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Figure 5.17: Resilience of multi-path routing over Sprint topology
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Figure 5.18: Resilience of multi-path routing over GE´ANT2 topology
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Table 5.6: Aggregate resilience at B3r,4
Number of paths Aggregate Resilience R
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
AT&T 0.5885 0.6379 0.6854
Sprint 0.7259 0.7596 0.7830
GE´ANT2 0.4909 0.5967 0.6195
ary and path routing–transport boundary. Simulations were conducted to
evaluate the resilience of the topology against link failures and the resilience
of a multi-path mechanism against perturbations in the underlying topol-
ogy. Note that while we presented our analysis based on a specific numerical
examples, the same analysis could be conducted with diﬀerent boundaries
for the state space regions or a diﬀerent service definition. We presented a
model to generate realistic hierarchical network topologies using real world
constraints. Lastly, we also presented a path diversification mechanism that
exploits the multiple paths to improve the resilience of the routing service in
the presence of challenges to the underlying network.
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Chapter 6
Resilience of MANETs
Wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) present an interesting case for
resilience analysis. MANETs are inherently challenged due their mobile wire-
less environment and are therefore prone to service failures. They are the
target of several mechanisms whose objective is to enhance the survivability.
We discussed in the previous chapter (Section 4.4.2) how the proposed met-
rics framework could be applied to evaluate the resilience of the a MANET at
multiple levels. In this chapter, we apply our framework to simulation-based
studies of MANETs to evaluate their resilience in the presence of various
challenges to normal operations.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 describes the
simulation setup. The resilience of MANET at three boundaries: topology–
routing, routing–transport, and transport–application is presented in Sec-
tion 6.2, Section 6.3, and Section 6.4 respectively. This is followed by de-
sign and evaluation of resilient routing protocols for two diﬀerent scenarios:
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millimeter-wave mesh networks in Section 6.5 and aeronautical networks in
Section 6.6. Lastly, a summary of chapter is presented in Section 6.7.
6.1 Simulation Setup
We used the ns-3 simulator [71] for conducting the simulations presented in
this chapter. While considering all the factors that aﬀect the simulations, we
choose parameters such that they cover a wide operational range from normal
to severely degraded operations in order to evaluate the resilience of diﬀerent
layers in the presence of challenges. The simulation setup consists of 25 nodes
in a 1000 × 1000 meter region. The random way point mobility model [] with
zero pause times was used. The wireless simulation uses the 802.11 PHY
module in infrastructure mode; the physical channel uses Friis propagation
model. The simulation parameters that are varied over the course of the
simulation runs include node speed, transmission power (and hence range),
and the network load. A detailed list of simulation parameters is given in
Table 6.1. All simulations are averaged over 10 runs and 95% confidence
intervals are shown as appropriate.
Figure 6.1, reproduces the table of metrics in the multilevel resilience analysis
of a MANET. Now, we will evaluate the resilience of the network at various
level boundaries.
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Table 6.1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Category Value
number of nodes fixed 25
simulation region fixed 1000 × 1000 metes
transmit range [meters] variable 100 – 800
node speed variable 5, 10, 20 , 50, 100
propagation mode fixed Friis propagation
PHY fixed YANS wifi Phy
MAC fixed 802.11 b
routing protocol variable DSDV, OLSR
transport protocol fixed UDP
data rate variable 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 Kbps
packet size fixed 1000 Bytes
application fixed CBR
traﬃc model fixed n(n− 1) flows = 600 flows
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Figure 6.1: Multilevel resilience evaluation of a MANET
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6.2 Resilience at Topology – Routing
At this boundary B3t,3r (reference Figure 6.1 ). we will evaluate the resilience
of the the MANET topology under the presence of challenges to its normal
operations. The operational metrics to represent the operational state of the
network at this layer are node speed and the transmission range. Secondly,
the service parameters that are relevant at this boundary are the relative size
of the largest connected component and the average link duration.
6.2.1 Variation in parameters
First, we show the variation of the first operational metric using standard
two dimensional plots. Figure 6.2 shows the variation of the average link
durations with transmit range and speed. The plot shows that the average
link duration is significantly aﬀected by both the parameters and varies over
a wide range. Since the ability of the routing protocol to find paths depends
on the churn in topology, this is a crucial metric to characterize the topol-
ogy service. The confidence intervals for these measurements are shown in
Figure 6.3 which shows relatively high confidence in the values.
Figure 6.4 shows the variation of second operational metric, the relative size
of the largest connected component (LC size). As can be seen from the
plot, the LC size depends primarily on the transmit range and does not vary
much with node speed. This is because the connectivity of the network is
heavily dominated by the transmit range especially at the higher end of the
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Figure 6.2: Variation of link durations
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Figure 6.3: Confidence intervals for link duration measurements
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transmit range. Again, the 95% confidence intervals in Figure 6.5 show high
confidence in the averaged results. Finally, we look at the variation in the
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Figure 6.4: Variation of LC size
number of partitions in Figure 6.6 and observe that this is the inverse of the
LC size as expected.
6.2.2 State Space Computations
We now generate the state space representation at this boundary. For all val-
ues of the the operational metrics and service parameters, we need to calcu-
late the corresponding projected values, N∗ and P ∗ of the state space region.
In order to get a single N∗ or P ∗ value from a set of operational metrics and
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Figure 6.6: Variation of partitions
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service parameters, we define an objective function. The methodology used
to perform these calculations is as follows:
When operational state and service space is represented more than one non-
independent metrics, we need to apply an objective function to obtain the
operational metrics and service parameters. Lets say there are two opera-
tional state of the network NS be represented by two metrics NS = {N1, N2}.
In order to project these metrics on to a two dimensional state space, we cal-
culate the projected stateN∗S = f(N1, N2) Secondly, we define the boundaries
for the normal, partially degraded and severely degraded regions. When the
regions are defined this way, they are are simply three states N1,N2,N3 with
their respective ranges in the projected space N∗S .
In order to calculate the x-axis value (say, n∗) for pair of instantaneous values
of the operational metrics n1, n2, we calculate the n∗1 corresponding to n1 and
n∗2 corresponding to n2 on a piecewise linear scale. So if n1 lies in the range of
the range of the ith regions, then n∗1 =
n1
n1i−n1i . Once we calculate n
∗
1 and n
∗
2
independently, we apply an objective function such that n∗ = αn∗1+(1−α)n∗2.
The values of α is determined by the service specification from the layer
above. Furthermore, the framework also supports logical objective functions
of AND and OR. These are treated as the special cases and the program
written to compute states supports this mode via special flags. The same
procedure is repeated for deriving the p∗ value from a set of selected service
parameters and the region boundaries. The objective function used is either
logical (AND, OR) or a linear function: p∗ = βp∗1 + (1− β)p∗2.
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Figure 6.7: Resilience state space at B3t,3r when α =max and β =max
Figure 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 shows the state space transitions for varying values of
α and β. In these Figures, the keyword “max” is used to indicate the logical
AND condition. These plots show that the MANET provides an acceptable
topology as long as the operational metrics at the level, transmit range and
node speed remain normal. However, as the operations degrade, the service
degrades in a near linear fashion. The slope of this resilience curve depends
on the objective function chosen. In the next section, we evaluate the impact
of this objective function and if an upper and lower limit on the resilience
can be found.
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6.3 Resilience at Routing – Transport
In this section, we evaluate the resilience of routing protocols (e.g. OLSR,
DSDV). We define the service at this boundary as the ability to provide
reachable paths to the transport layer in the presence of disruptions or per-
turbations to the underlying topology. Therefore, we characterize this service
using one parameter: path availability, which is defined as percentage of time
the network is able to find valid path between a pair of nodes, averaged over
all node pairs. Therefore, P = {P1} = {path reliability}. Secondly, the op-
erational metrics at this level are nothing but the service parameters from
the layer below. Therefore, N = {N1, N2} = {LC size, link durations}.
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Figure 6.10: Routing state space with OLSR
133
Based on the simulation states we compute the state transitions using the
3×3 regions modeled as three states each in the operational space and ser-
vice space. We conducted simulations using two diﬀerent routing protocols:
OLSR and DSDV. Figure 6.10 shows the state space for the OLSR routing
protocol when using α = β = max, meaning that logical AND is being used
to derive x values from the two operational metrics. For the same values of α
and β, we show the state space for DSDV protocol in Figure 6.11. Comparing
these two protocols (as in Figure 6.12), we see that OLSR is more resilient to
perturbations in the normal operating conditions compared to DSDV. While
the absolute location of points varies with diﬀerent values of α, β as shown
in Figure 6.13, in generally OLSR has a better resilience profile than DSDV.
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Figure 6.11: Routing state space with DSDV
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Figure 6.12: Comparing the resilience of OLSR and DSDV with α =max
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Figure 6.13: Comparing the resilience of OLSR and DSDV with α = 0.35
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6.3.1 Impact of Objective Function Parameters
In order to determine the impact of the objective function in the analysis of
the resilience, we explore the full range of α and β in this section. Figure 6.14
shows the state space plot when the value if α is varied from 0 to 1 in
increments of 0.01. Note that since there is only one service metric, β = 1
for all runs.
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Figure 6.14: Impact of α on OLSR state space
From this Figure, we observe that if we probe the entire space of the objective
function, we get a envelope of the resilience. In other words, we get an
empirical bound on the resilience. Similarly, Figure 6.15 shows the DSDV
states when varying α over the range of 0 to 1. Comparing the two in
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Figure 6.16, we see that the envelope of the DSDV tends to lean more towards
the impaired and unacceptable service region when compared to OLSR.
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Figure 6.15: Impact of α on DSDV state space
6.4 Resilience at Transport – Application
In this section, we evaluate the resilience of the transport protocol under the
presence of challenges. The service provided by the transport protocol to the
application is end-to-end data transfer in the presence of perturbation in the
paths provided by the underlying transport layer. The service parameters at
this level are the packet delivery ratio (PDR) and end-to-end delay. There-
fore, P = {P1, P2} = {PDR, delay}. In addition to the the service parameters
from the layer below, the operational metrics at this level include the relative
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Figure 6.16: Impact of α on routing state space
traﬃc load that is dependent on the rate of the transport protocol. Relative
load in this example is arbitrarily calculated as 1 for a sending rate of 0.54
Mb/s. Therefore, N = {N1, N2} = {path availability, relative load}.
Using the state computation procedure detailed in Section 6.2.2, we plot the
state transitions of the UDP protocol on a 3 × 3 region for two diﬀerent data
sets in Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18. Looking at all the state instances, we
clearly observe a specific pattern, an envelope that characterizes the resilience
of the protocol. We observe that the service degrades almost linearly with
respect to degradations in the operational state. Furthermore, the service
sharply declines as the operations become severely degraded
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Figure 6.17: Transport state space: UDP resilience, run 1
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Figure 6.18: Transport state space: UDP resilience, run 2
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6.5 Resilient Routing in WDTNs
In this section we consider several mechanisms as dictated by the principles
presented in Section 3.3 to improve the resilience of weather disruption toler-
ant networks (WDTNs) which employ millimeter-wave links. In the previous
sections of this chapter, we evaluated the resilience of some of the ISP-level
topologies against random link failures. However, in the case of millimeter-
wave mesh network, the main challenge observed is due to weather disrup-
tions results in correlated link failures. Furthermore, due to the nature of
these transmissions in high frequency bands, the physical layer can only pro-
vide a certain level of resilience in terms of link robustness. The topology
of mesh networks is fixed: they form a basic grid network, therefore the re-
silience of the topology sublayer is also fixed. This implies that additional
resilience against failures that penetrate through the defenses of physical and
topological levels must be addressed at path routing level. In Section 5.3.1,
we presented multipath as a mechanism to improve the resilience of the rout-
ing in the presence of perturbations to the network topology. In this section,
we present predictive weather-assisted routing to enhance the resilience of
millimeter-wave mesh network in the presence of environmental challenges.
Specifically, we apply the principles of translucency [P9], diversity [P12],
self-organizing and autonomic behavior [P13], and adaptability [P18] to de-
sign a resilient routing algorithm. Furthermore, we evaluate the resilience of
the proposed algorithm to weather disruptions using the metrics framework.
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While we present the resilient routing mechanisms in this section, a rigorous
approach to resilient millimeter-wave mesh networks based on experimenta-
tion, modeling, and simulation is given in Appendix A.
6.5.1 Millimeter-Wave Mesh Networks
With increasing demand for high-bandwidth data access to end users, espe-
cially in metropolitan areas where the infrastructure cost of laying in new
fiber is prohibitive, wireless broadband access technologies provide a viable
alternative. One such alternative for 3G and potentially 4G service provider
networks is the millimeter-wave mesh network that operates in the 71 – 86
GHz frequency band and have been proposed as a cost-eﬀective high-speed
alternative for fixed wireless mesh networks [72–74]. Existing commercial
radios in this band can deliver data rates as high as 1 Gb/s with the poten-
tial for higher speeds on the order of 10 Gb/s using advanced modulation
schemes [75]. Additionally, line-of-sight beams enable spatial reuse with mesh
topologies.
However, their frequency of operation is highly susceptible to weather disrup-
tions. In particular, millimeter-wave transmissions suﬀer heavy attenuation
due to precipitation [72,76–78]. As a result, link availability and reliability is
significantly impaired during rain storms [72]. We conducted experiments to
quantify the impact of weather disruption on millimeter-wave links. These
experiments are presented in Appendix A. Based on the data collected, an
empirical analysis of millimeter-wave links and mesh topologies using these
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Figure 6.19: Schematic of an MWMN with weather system.
links is presented in Appendix B. In order to provide dependable paths in
such a network, it is essential to design and engineer disruption tolerance
into the network. In a mesh topology, as shown in Figure 6.19, this can be
achieved through adaptive routing at the network layer. The following sec-
tions present a network-layer approach to overcome link instability by routing
around failures within a mesh topology.
6.5.2 Mesh Routing Algorithms
This section presents two routing mechanisms (proactive and predictive) that
exploit cross-layer mechanisms to leverage physical-layer information at the
network layer. First, we present XL-OSPF, a cross-layered version of the well-
known OSPF [79] routing protocol. This proactive approach uses link-cost
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metrics derived from physical-layer information to maximize the performance
of OSPF in the presence of degraded links without the usual penalty of frame
loss detection. Secondly, we present a predictive weather assisted routing
protocol (P-WARP), that utilises short-term weather forecasts to reroute
ahead of an impending link failure. We evaluate the performance of both
approaches in terms of eﬃciency and survivability under weather disruptions.
6.5.3 XL-OSF: Cross-Layered OSPF
A cross-layer approach to link metrics could significantly improve the per-
formance of dynamic link state algorithms [80, 81]. We choose OSPF (Open
Shortest-Path First) [79] as the link-state routing protocol due to its wide
deployment, use in research, and applicability to fixed networks. OSPF re-
lies on two basic mechanisms to determine link state. One is the link state
advertisements (LSAs) generated by each node that carry the status of all
its links along with their costs. These are flooded throughout the network.
Secondly, hello packets are used to determine if the link to a given neighbor
is still alive. A dead interval based on the hello interval is used to detect
dead links. The routes are proactively updated after the LSAs propagate
through the network. With rapidly varying link quality, the only mechanism
through which OSPF can detect link degradations is when four consecutive
hello packets are dropped, in its default configuration. Since the size of hello
packets is much smaller than data packets, a BER that results in four con-
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secutive hello drops will correspond to a significantly higher data packet drop
rate.
The first mechanism that can be used to improve the performance of OSPF
is a cost metric that is proportional to the bit error rate of the link. However,
this is a diﬃcult proposition given the lack of information exchange between
the physical (and MAC) layer that sees the actual packet losses and the
network layer which determines the routes. Several mechanisms have been
proposed in the literature [82, 83] that use in-band (packet header) or out-
of-band (probe packets) signaling to determine the actual packet error rate.
For the purpose of analysis, we assume such a mechanism that informs the
end hosts of the eﬀective packet error rate. We define a cost metric that
is proportional the the eﬀective packet error rate. Assuming uniform dis-
tribution of the bit errors, the cost of a link between two nodes i and j is
calculated as:
Cij = P × BERi,j × γ, (6.1)
where P is the average packet size on the network, BERij is the bit error rate
observed on the link, and γ is the scale factor. The scale factor determines
the sensitivity of the link cost with respect to change in BER and is set to
1000 in our simulations. A BERthresh of 10−8 is used to define the minimum
observable change in BER. Further, hysteresis is used with a Hthresh of 10%
to avoid excessive route flaps in the network. Finally, the value of cost is
bounded in the range of [1, 1000] which determines the maximum number
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of hops a packet can traverse in order to avoid an error-prone or lossy link.
Since, the primary objective in the MWMN is to avoid disrupted links at all
cost, we set this range to 1000. The performance of the modified XL-OSPF
with this cost metric is discussed in Appendix C.
Even with the error based cost metrics, OSPF remains a proactive protocol
that requires a finite amount of time before it adapts to changes in link state.
If the application or service demands a highly-reliable service, proactive pro-
tocols must have a very short update interval on the order of milliseconds.
But this adds an unacceptable level of overhead, even for broadband net-
works. In the following section, we discuss a predictive routing scheme that
is intended to overcome this problem.
6.5.4 P-WARP:
Predictive Weather-Assisted Routing Protocol
As discussed above, proactive algorithms may not be able to meet stringent
service requirements (e.g. 50-ms restoration for circuit emulation and CBR
traﬃc) in MWMNs during weather disruptions. Furthermore, it is diﬃcult
to measure eﬀective BER or FER at end hosts without an explicit signaling
mechanism. In this section, we investigate the use of information external to
the network in order to predict the state of links over the next time epoch
or several epochs ahead.
The proposed predictive routing algorithm is a link-state algorithm that
utilises weather radar data to forecast the future condition of the link. In
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contrast to the XL-OSPF discussed above, the primary diﬀerence is the mech-
anism through which the link costs are obtained. While XL-OSPF depends
on BER measurement from errored packets, we propose P-WARP (predictive
weather-assisted routing protocol), in which BER of each link is calculated
from weather radar reflectivity data modeled in real-time using the method-
ology discussed in Section A.3. This processing is done at a either a single
core node or a small subset of core nodes which are connected to the exter-
nal Internet and are capable of receiving weather radar data. In either case,
multiple-path connectivity into the mesh is necessary for high-availability of
the radar data1. The topology and physical locations of the fixed network
nodes are pre-programmed in to the software module that performs the link
BER calculation as well as the PER (packet error rate) for a predefined
average-packet size. The cost metric for individual links is based on the ef-
fective link BER similar to XL-OSPF. While XL-OSPF proactively derives
costs based on measured BER and propagates updates with conventional
LSAs, P-WARP uses short term weather forecast to predict link costs. Thus
the link cost is calculated using Equation (6.1) with the same thresholds
described in Section 6.5.3.
Link Status Updates and Route Computation
The weather-based link-status updates (WLSUs) in P-WARP are slightly
diﬀerent from the conventional link-state advertisements (LSAs) of OSPF.
1Note that this connectivity can be provided by low rate links such as lower frequency
radio links that are much susceptible to weather
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WLSUs are generated from the core nodes and contain the costs of all links
in the network based on their predicted quality. These weather-based up-
dates are flooded throughout the network. When an individual node receives
a WLSU, it recomputes routes using the shortest-path first algorithm. How-
ever, unlike OSPF, individual nodes do not generate separate LSAs for the
links to their neighbors. This approach significantly reduces the protocol
overhead because only one update is generated for all the links and updates
are generated only when a change in one or more link costs is predicted.
Thus, the network reroutes traﬃc ahead of the incoming storm thereby min-
imizing, and perhaps eliminating packet loss. It is important to note that
while we are using weather predictions to alter the network state, the time
scale of the weather predictions are on the order of tens of seconds, a short
but accurate interval in weather time, however a very long interval in network
time, suﬃcient for predictive routing.
Route Sensitivity
It is clearly evident that the eﬀective BER on each link will vary contin-
uously over the duration of the storm. In order to avoid route flaps and
false alarms, we use thresholds along with hysteresis. A minimum notice-
able change BERthresh is defined below which all BER changes are ignored.
Further, a hysteresis percentage Hthresh determines the minimum change in
the cost of a link for an update to be generated. The various steps in the
operation of the P-WARP are enumerated in Algorithm 1. Table 6.2 shows a
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brief comparison of the proposed routing protocols XL-OSPF and P-WARP
with a standard OSPF implementation.
Table 6.2: Comparison of routing protocols
Metric Std. OSPF XL-OSPF P-WARP
cross-layered no yes yes
link cost Cij typically 1 ∝ BERij ∝ BERij
link failure detection 40 s 10 s 0 s
data rerouting proactive fast proactive predictive
control packet LSA LSA WLSU
update rate periodic 10s periodic 10s aperiodic
6.5.5 Resilience Analysis
In order to evaluate the resilience of XL-OSPF and P-WARP, we conducted
simulations using actual storm patterns observed during our experimentation
phase. Details of experimentation setup, field data collection and simulations
are presented in Appendix A. We evaluate the resilience of the millimeter-
wave network at the routing – transport layer. At this layer boundary, the
service the end-to-end paths provided by the routing protocol. Therefore,
we characterize this service using one parameter: path availability, which is
defined as percentage of time the network is able to find valid path between
a pair of nodes, averaged over all node pairs. Therefore, a service state
is represented as: P = {P1} = {path reliability}. The operational state
is characterized by the underlying topology and the perturbations due to
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Algorithm 1 Predictive Weather-Assisted Routing
Step 1: Generate WLSU at the central node
Input: vertices V , edges E, radar reflectivity data RRD, geographic node
positions, forecast window δt
1: At time t, receive predicted weather for time epoch t+ δt
2: update← 0
3: for all (i, j) ∈ E do
4: GSM(t+ δt)← f(RRD(t+ δt) {calculate geometric storm model}
5: Aij(t+ δt)← g(GSM(t+ δt) {calculate link attenuation based on link
and storm overlap}
6: BERij(t+ δt)← h(Aij(t+ δt)) {calculate link BER as a function of its
attenuation and radio characteristics}
7: if BERij(t+ δt)− BERij(t) > BERthresh then
8: Cij(t+ δt)← BERij × P × γ {calculate predicted link cost}
9: if Cij(t+ δt)− Cij(t) > Hthresh then
10: update← 1
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: if update = 1 then
15: generate WLSU(t+ δt) consisting of Cij(t+ δt), ∀(i, j) ∈ E
16: end if
Step 2: Recompute routes at each node
Input: WLSU(t+ δt)
1: update local cost matrix C such that Cij ← Cij(t+ δt), ∀(i, j) ∈ E
2: compute least cost paths to obtain R(t+ δt)
3: schedule R← R(t+ δt) at time t = t+ δt
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weather disruptions and is quantified by the packet error rate averaged over
all network links. Therefore, N = {N1} = {averaged PER}.
Table 6.3: Operational regions: routing in millimeter-wave networks
Region Operational metrics
averaged PER n1
Normal n1 ≤ 0.05
Partially degraded 0.05 < n1 ≤ 0.50
Severely degraded n1 > 0.50
In order to quantify resilience, we evaluate the state transitions over the 3 × 3
state space when the network is subjected to rain storms. The regions for op-
erational metrics (avg PER) are defined in Table 6.3 and service parameters
are defined in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Service regions: routing in millimeter-wave networks
Region Service Parameters
path availability p1
Acceptable p1 ≥ 0.99
Impaired 0.75 ≤ p1 < 0.99
Unacceptable p1 < 0.75
Figure 6.20 compares the resilience of the P-WARP against traditional OSPF
and static routing when the network is subjected to the first observed storm.
For details of this storm, please refer to Appendix A.2. As shown in figure,
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it is observed that P-WARP is significantly more resilient when compared
to the other two algorithms. With P-WARP, the service remains acceptable
under normal operating conditions as well as to some extent in partially
degraded conditions. Furthermore, as the network degraded severely, P-
WARP outperforms the other two in terms of resilience. Given that this is
a millimeter-wave network which is significantly aﬀected by rain as well as
humidity, the normal operating conditions are defined to be the case with
average PER up to 5%. This is because, even under normal operations, the
link observes non-negligible errors. The path availability with both Static
and OSPF routing degrades sharply with increasing PER.
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Figure 6.20: Comparing routing resilience in presence of first rain storm
Secondly, we compare the resilience of XL-OSPF versus P-WARP for the
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same storm. As shown in Figure 6.21 We observe that the state space transi-
tions for these two mechanisms are very similar, with P-WARP being slightly
more resilient. This is due to the predictive nature of P-WARP wherein the
network reroutes around links before they degrade using weather prediction.
Contrast this to of XL-OSPF, for which the algorithm actively measures the
observed PER and quickly routes around links that are experiencing weather
disruptions. However, for a brief duration between detection and rerouting,
several paths are unavailable thereby leading to reduced path availability.
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Figure 6.21: Comparing XL-OSPF vs P-WARP, first rain storm
Figures 6.22 and 6.23 show the resilience comparison of various protocols
when the network is subjected to a second rain storm. As compared to
the first storm, this storm was more intense, covered a larger geographical
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Figure 6.22: Comparing routing resilience in presence of second rain storm
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Figure 6.23: Comparing XL-OSPF vs P-WARP, second rain storm
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area and lasted for a longer duration (Appendix A.2). We again calculated
the path availability of each protocol while the storm system passed over the
simulated network. The results indicate that P-WARP and XL-OSPF show
similar resilience while outperforming traditional protocols such as static and
OSPF.
6.6 Resilient Routing in Airborne Networks
In the Section 6.5, we considered resilient routing in millimeter-wave mesh
networks in which the challenge was weather disruptions. We presented new
mechanisms that are resilient to perturbations in link quality. This section
considers yet another scenario, aeronautical telemetry networks in which the
primary challenge is the highly dynamic nature of the network arising from
the very high node speeds [84]. The objective is to develop resilient routing
mechanisms that can provide acceptable service in the presence of high node
mobility or extremely short contact durations. Again, we apply the principles
of Section 3.3 to design resilient routing for highly dynamic mobile ad hoc
networks.
6.6.1 Aeronautical Telemetry Networks
Aeronautical telemetry networks, as the one discussed in [85] primarily con-
sist of airborne nodes traveling at extremely high speeds. When the node
speeds are in excess of Mach 3, the contract durations can be extremely short
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leading to a highly dynamic network with constantly changing topologies.
Other challenges to communication in this environment includes bandwidth
constraints due to the limited spectrum availability, and limited transmis-
sion range due to power and weight constraints. For a typical scenario [84],
the contact duration can be less than few seconds. Furthermore, due to the
sparse nature of the telemetry network, the network is not always connected
resulting in intermittent connectivity.
Given the various challenges, resilient routing in this environment demands
exploitation of cross-layer information, especially the geo-location and tra-
jectory of nodes to assist in routing. However, most of the existing routing
protocols are not suitable for this environment because of slow route con-
vergence and lack of cross-layering support. On the other hand, cross-layer
aware protocols such as location aware and beaconless routing are not de-
signed for extremely high speed operation.
6.6.2 AeroRP: Location Aware Routing
The aeronautical routing protocol (AeroRP) [86] is a location-aware highly
adaptive routing algorithm that is specifically designed to be resilient to
speed induced disruptions. It utilizes a number of resilience mechanisms as
discussed below:
1. Proactive behavior: AeroRP is a fundamentally proactive routing
protocol, but with limited updates thereby lowering protocol overheard.
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2. Exploits cross-layer controls: AeroRP is designed to exploit the
explicit cross-layering support provided by AeroNP and the geographic
node location and trajectory information available at nodes.
3. Per-hop behavior: Unlike existing protocols, AeroRP forwards data
per-hop based on partial local information and routes thereby avoiding
the necessity for global convergence, making it especially suitable for
highly-dynamic environments.
4. Multi-modal: Military applications present a high level of variation
in their operational parameters. For example, based on the security
requirements of the test application, the geolocation of the nodes may
or may not be available. In order to support these dynamics in op-
eration, policies, and constraints, AeroRP provides multiple modes of
operation.
The basic operation of AeroRP consists of two phases. In the first phase,
each AN learns and makes a list of available neighbors at any given point in
time. It utilizes a number of diﬀerent mechanisms to facilitate neighbor dis-
covery, including snooping, hello beacons, and periodic updates. The second
phase of the algorithm is to find the appropriate next hop to forward the
data packets. In order to forward the packets toward a specific destination,
additional information such as location data or route updates is required.
AeroRP utilizes the node location and trajectory, when available, in making
forwarding decisions. Based on the set of discovered neighbors, each node
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decides the best course for each packet such that with every transmission the
packet ends up being physically closer to its destination. For each of these
two phases, AeroRP defines a number of diﬀerent mechanisms to choose
from. The particular choice of mechanism to be used is dependent upon the
mode of operation because the mode of operation determines which of the
mechanisms are feasible given the scenario specific restrictions (e.g. security
restrictions). Simulations results have shown that AeroRP is significantly
more resilient when compared to other protocols 2.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we applied the proposed metrics framework to MANETs in
order to evaluate multilevel resilience. We presented how state space compu-
tation can be performed with the help of an objective function. The impact
of the parameters of the objective function was also explored. The resilience
analysis was conducted for 4 successive levels or 3 level boundaries: topol-
ogy → routing → transport → application. We quantified the resilience of
the topology and compared the OLSR and DSDV in terms of their ability
to survive perturbations in the topology. Secondly, applying the principles
of ResiliNets architecture, we developed resilient routing mechanisms: XL-
OSPF and P-WARP for millimeter-wave networks and AeroRP for aeronau-
tical telemetry networks. The resilience of the proposed mechanisms was
quantified using the metrics framework.
2Details of the each phase and the simulation results are presented in [86].
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation presents a comprehensive approach to resilient networks
with the focus on quantitative evaluation of resilience. To this end, we have
introduced a new metrics framework and resilience strategy both of which
were applied to a number of scenarios. This chapter presents a summary of
the dissertation, major contributions, conclusions drawn, and future work.
7.1 Conclusions
Modern society depends on the networks in general and the Internet in par-
ticular for their critical services. These services range from every day conve-
nience to economic stability and national security. Besides this dependence
on legacy networks, there are a growing number of services that are based
on emerging networks such as wireless, mobile ad hoc, and sensor networks.
The challenges to the normal operation of these networks and services come
from a variety of sources. While some are inherent to the environment (e.g.,
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wireless) others are generated from forces external to the network (e.g. nat-
ural disasters). While some challenges are on small scale (e.g., link cuts),
others happen on massive scale (e.g., power failures). And while some are
unintentional (e.g., component failures), others are intentional attacks (e.g.,
viruses). We termed the ability of a network to provide and maintain an
acceptable level of service in the face of these challenges as resilience. Sim-
ilar measures have been studied in literature in the fields of fault tolerance,
disruption tolerance, and survivability. Some of the well known measures
include reliability, availability, dependability, and performability. Existing
methodologies to evaluate resilience-like properties of the system are often
domain, failure, and level specific. While these provide valuable information
regarding systems behavior, they do not provide a comprehensive view of
resilience at any arbitrary level.
The contributions of this dissertation are three-fold: first, motivated by the
multilevel resilience principle and the resilience strategy D2R2 + DR, we
present a multilevel metrics framework. Secondly, we present a compre-
hensive rigorous treatise towards network topologies including a model to
generate realistic topologies and a rigorous evaluation of resilience using the
proposed framework. Thirdly, we present unique resilience mechanisms at
the routing layer including path diversification, predictive weather-assisted
routing, and location-aware highly adaptive routing and characterize their
resilience in the presence of perturbations to the underlying network.
In this dissertation, we define resilience at a given service boundary, generally
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referred to as a level boundary Bi,j. This boundary can be defined between
any two successive or arbitrary layers. The communication network at any
given level is viewed in two dimensions: operational space and service space.
The operational space N represents the state of all elements of the network
below the service boundary and are quantified using a set of metrics intu-
itively termed as operational metrics. The other dimension P represents the
service that is provided to the network above this boundary and is quantified
by a set of metrics termed as service parameters. The state of the network is
then represented by the tuple of operational metrics and service parameters.
Furthermore, we formulate that the challenges to the network manifest as
perturbations to the operational conditions of the network leading to possi-
ble (but not necessarily) service degradations. Given that networks cannot
be infinitely resilient, a “good” network is one which degrades gracefully in
the presence of increasing challenges. Therefore, we evaluate the resilience
Rij as a function of these transitions in the network state-space and quantify
as the area under the curve. At any given boundary, the network is said to
be resilient if it prevents degradation in the operational condition from lead-
ing to degradations in service. Lastly, the proposed approach is inherently
multilevel. The objective is to quantify the network resilience at a given
layer so that resilience mechanisms can be implemented and subsequently
evaluated. This approach is based on the ResiliNets architecture and its goal
to provide the best resilience at any level given practical constraints. To this
end, we show the service parameters at a given level map to the operational
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metrics of the level above, thereby providing a seamless method to conduct
multilevel resilience analysis. We demonstrated this approach with numeri-
cal examples at the link–topology, topology–routing, routing–transport, and
transport–application boundaries.
The second major contribution of this dissertation is a model to generate re-
alistic network topologies based on practical constraints as well as evaluation
of topological resilience using the proposed framework. Network topology
research plays a key role in evaluation of various protocols and mechanisms.
However, the existing body of research primarily focusses on generating log-
ical topologies based on link connectivity models. While these are crucial
to evaluate the performance of protocols such as BGP that operate over the
logical topologies, they do not accurately model the resilience of the actual
topologies. For this purpose, we developed a location and cost constrained
topology generation model that focusses on first realistic node location and
secondly cost constrained link connectivity. We evaluated the topological re-
silience against random link failures for ISP-level topologies of AT&T, Sprint,
and GE´ANT. We define service at the topology–path routing boundary as
the topological connectivity and presented an aggregate measure of resilience
R over the range of [0 1] where, a value of 1 represents perfect resilience
and a value of zero indicates no resilience. We also present a path diver-
sification mechanism which exploits the diversity in the graph to improve
path robustness. We show that by using multiple paths, the resilience at the
routing–transport boundary can be increased to varying extent depending
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upon the number of paths used.
The third major contribution of this dissertation is a new resilience mecha-
nism at the routing–transport layer to improve the resilience of millimeter-
wave mesh networks in the presence of weather disruptions. We characterized
the challenge posed to millimeter-wave mesh networks based on actual ex-
perimental data along with a respective geometric model. We proposed two
resilient routing protocols XL-OSPF and P-WARP based on cross-layering
between the physical and network layers. While XL-OSPF uses cost metrics
proportional to bit errors in order to select optimal paths, P-WARP uses
a predictive mechanism based on weather forecasts to find optimal paths
thereby providing paths that are resilient to weather disruptions. Perfor-
mance analysis has shown that the proposed mechanisms outperform tradi-
tional routing. Lastly, we developed a resilient routing protocol, AeroRP for
aeronautical telemetry networks that exploits location and trajectory infor-
mation to provide acceptable service in the presence of highly dynamic and
intermittent connectivity.
7.2 Future Work
The metrics framework presented in this dissertation provides a versatile
basis to evaluate resilience at any arbitrary boundary. We showed resilience
analysis at specific boundaries in our analysis. Evaluating resilience at other
levels over as well as over diﬀerent network types can be done as a part of
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future work. Further research is needed to derive a single multilevel resilience
metric R = f(Rij) ∀ij, if feasible. We presented simple aggregate measure
based on the resilience states to get a single resilience metric. Additional
methods could be explored to derive very specific metric from the state-
transitions. The metrics framework can be applied both to steady state as
well as transient analysis. We have considered cases for steady state resilience
analysis. A transient analysis of networks can be conducted to determine how
a network reacts to challenges in general and malicious attacks in particular.
The instantaneous state transitions as the network experiences a challenge
can quantify the resilience in terms of the D2R2+DR cycles. Specifically, the
time taken to revert to original state and the path taken through the state
space (say the area under the curve) determine the resilience of the network.
In this dissertation, we presented a location and cost constrained hierarchical
model to generate realistic physical network topologies. The emphasis of the
current model is on location of the nodes and the reproducing the hierarchy
of the real networks. Further research can be conducted to determine realistic
link models based on actual fiber paths when subjected to area-based chal-
lenges such as natural disasters [87]. Even though the logical topologies are
heavily influenced by the overlay topologies and policy decisions, they are
still shaped by the underlying physical topology that the presented model
generates. Further research can be conducted to model logical topologies
given an underlying physical topology.
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Appendix A
Millimeter-Wave Experiments
In order to understand the impact of actual weather events on millimeter-
wave transmission, two millimeter-wave links were deployed and test data
was collected for a period of one year long. For the same time duration,
radar reflectivity data of the region in which the links were deployed was
also collected. This appendix describes the setup for the link measurements
and the radar measurements.
A.1 Link Measurements
To collect link-performance data, two millimeter wave radio links were de-
ployed in Lawrence, Kansas. In order to observe actual signal attenuation
and the resulting frame errors, we used one radio with no error correction
and to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of error correction coding in this specific
case, we used a second radio with forward error correction (FEC). As shown
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Figure A.1: Location of weather stations and radio links
in Figure 1, the transmission path was configured with an intermediate hop;
however the primary performance eﬀects arose from the 8.7 km link. To
collect weather data for this research project, weather stations using Vaisala
WXT510 [88] instruments were deployed at five locations, each equipped with
sensors capable of recording temperature, humidity, wind, and most impor-
tantly, precipitation [88]. Figure A.1 shows the locations of the weather
stations and the radio links. Since the purpose of this study is to evalu-
ate real world scenarios, two oﬀ-the-shelf radio systems were chosen. Even
though the two radios diﬀer slightly in their design parameters, as shown in
Table A.1, their sensitivity to weather-induced attenuation is similar because
of the identical BER vs. SNR curves of the OOK (on-oﬀ keying) and BFSK
(binary frequency shift keying) modulation schemes. Furthermore, one radio
implements a Reed-Solomon (204,188) FEC while the other has no FEC.
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Table A.1: Radio parameters
Parameter Without FEC With FEC
TX / RX Frequency
(FDD)
73.5 GHz / 83.5 GHz 72.5 GHz / 82.5 GHz
TX Power 17 dBm 17 dBm
Antenna Dia. / Gain
/ Beamwidth
63 cm / 51 dBi / 0.4 ◦ 31 cm / 43 dBi / 0.8 ◦
RX Noise Figure 6 dB 7 dB
Modulation OOK BFSK
Data Rate 1250 Mb/s 1000 Mb/s
FEC Type None RS (204, 188)
The objective is to measure the impact of low intensity precipitation on the
radios as well as evaluate the eﬀectiveness of FEC in overcoming bit errors.
The link was set up in a loop-back configuration and a GigE tester was used
to measure FER along with a number of other performance metrics. To
provide input for mesh networking and resilient routing algorithm studies,
the link performance metric collected was the FER. Here the FER is the
percentage of data frames that are lost during every 30 second interval. The
tester transmits on average 3,348,000 512-byte data frames every 30 seconds
(0.5 Gb/s). These transmissions, after being looped back at the other end of
the line, are recovered at the transmitting end. The FER is then calculated
as the percentage of frames lost or in error during the 30 second interval.
Given the total number of frames transmitted, a FER lower than 10−7 is
not observable. Since it takes 10 seconds to process and record this data,
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samples were collected every 40 seconds. All observations reported here are
from 01 October 2007 through 30 September 2008. Over the course of a single
day, around 14,400 (2,880 per station) weather samples and approximately
4,320 (2,160 per link) link performance samples were recorded. Later, we
will present an analysis of the data collected to derive statistical conclusions
regarding the impact of weather events on millimeter-wave links.
A.2 Radar Measurements
In order to determine the impact of actual rain storms, we collected radar
reflectivity data from the National Weather Service for the Midwest US. The
eﬀect of a weather disruption on millimeter-wave network mainly depends on
two factors: rain rate and the geographic footprint of the storm [89]. Both of
these parameters vary from one geographic region to the other. For example,
the analysis of weather data from southern Great Plains region of the US [90]
shows that approximately 78% of all storms are smaller than 25 km in diam-
eter and account for only 1.0% of the precipitation. Furthermore, only 1% of
the storms are large (over 40 km diameter) and account for 85% of precip-
itation. The remaining 20% are medium sized storms (20–40 km diameter)
accounting for 14% of precipitation. We draw two conclusions [89] from this
study: First, the majority of the storms are small enough for a metropolitan
size mesh network (approx. 1000 km2) to reroute traﬃc around the storm.
Secondly, even moderate sized storms are likely to have small size heavy in-
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tensity regions since they don’t account for a significant percentage of rainfall.
This is consistent with the our measurements presented in Section B.1.1 (See
Figure B.2). It is important to note that similar studies will be needed for
other geographic regions with significantly diﬀerent weather patterns, such
as the Pacific Northwest US and Europe.
We selected specific weather-events to conduct a in-depth analysis on the
impact of individual events on single links as well as mesh networks. In
order to get a diverse set of weather patterns in this study, we specifically
choose eight storms that were topologically diﬀerent with significantly diﬀer-
ent characteristics, e.g. small and large cells, multiple cells on a front line,
and intense front line. Their duration over a 1000 km2 mesh varied from just
under an hour to several hours1. Figures A.2 and A.3 each show an instance
of two of the eight selected storms.2,3 These match the previously described
common Midwest US characteristic of distinct cells with high intensity.
A.3 Modeling Rain Storms
In order to evaluate the eﬀective attenuation on each link in a MWMN, we
use the weather-radar echo intensity to determine the overlap of a storm cell
with a given link. This is done through a geometric model as discussed below:
1MWMN grid Node 0 is geographically located at 38.8621N, 95.3793W
2Distribution 1 observed at 20:39:26 Z on 30 September 2008
3Distribution 2 observed at 05:04:11 Z on 22 April 2008
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Figure A.2: Rain distribution 1 over MWMN links
Figure A.3: Rain distribution 2 over MWMN links
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A.4 Geometric Storm Model (GSM)
In this model, each region in a radar reflectivity map shown in Figure A.4 is
modeled as an ellipse (R1–R5) as shown in Figure A.5. While the resolution
of the radar reflectivity diﬀerentiates many levels of precipitation, the pro-
posed model uses only three levels indicating high (red), low (yellow), and
little or no (green) precipitation so that the method remains tractable. The
exact value of the rain rate corresponding to a given region depends on the
location and the precipitation characteristics. For example, the simulations
in our study use a value of 2mm/hr and 5 mm/hr to represent low and high
intensity regions respectively. Note that there could be several regions of
the same rain intensity in a given storm and the rain rates corresponding
to each color vary depending upon the geographical location. Finally, indi-
vidual links are modeled as line segments. The procedure to calculate the
eﬀective attenuation for a given storm as it passes over a fixed mesh network
is discussed below.
For a given storm, we first generate the geometrical model of the storm
before it enters the geographic region of the network. Secondly, as the storm
moves across the network, we generate snap shots of the storm pattern (using
ellipsoids) at diﬀerent time intervals to capture both the regular progress as
well as key points when the storm changes direction and the splitting and
merging of cells occur4. Then, with the help of an interpolation program we
4This process currently relies to some extent on manual visualization of the radar data.
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Figure A.5: Storm model corresponding to Fig. A.4
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generated the movement of these ellipsoids over a fixed time step (e.g. one
second).
Given that the position of storm ellipses at any time instant t for the entire
duration of the simulation, along with coordinates of the nodes and hence
the links, we calculate the intersection between the links and the storm el-
lipses so as to determine the attenuation experienced be each link. Using
simple geometry, we calculate the intersection of links with an ellipsoid to
determine the length of the link li aﬀected by a given storm region i. Using
ITU-R P.838-3 model [91], the attenuation of link due to this storm is calcu-
lated as γR × li, where γR is the rain rate associated with the storm region.
The total attenuation on a given link is the summation of the attenuation
resulting from all the individual regions that intersect or encompass the line
segment5. Subsequently, the eﬀective BER is obtained from the attenuation
based on the specific radio design. Note that this model is considers only
the attenuation eﬀects due to rain. While other precipitation factors such as
humidity contribute significantly lower in the signal attenuation, additional
models are needed to capture their impact.
This example shows that while certain links (e.g. BC) are severely degraded
Future plans include a complete data processing module to automate the process, which
has the added benefit of increased rain rate resolution as discussed later in this section.
5Note that the quantization of the rain rates in a storm to 3-levels and assumption of
constant rain rate inside a region are two simplifying measures in this model. However, the
impact of this simplification is conservative estimate of link quality. Future work involves
automating this process which would permit the integration of the point attenuation values
along the length of the link using the actual value of the rain rate from the radar data as
opposed to the quantized values of this 3-level model.
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due to the heavy rain, it is possible to re-route traﬃc on other adjacent links
(e.g. BA) that are not in an intense rain region. We argue in the following
section that this pattern of rain intensity distribution is typical for a majority
of storms in the US Great Plains. While Figure A.4 shows the storm at one
time instant, it can be said without loss of generality that an actual rain
event is a series of such snapshots that change over time depending upon the
velocity and evolution of the storm. In order to model a storm in real time,
we continuously calculate the attenuation for all links as the storm moves
through the network. The changes in the link attenuation are dependent on
the dynamics of the storm relative to the network.
174
Appendix B
Empirical Analysis of
Millimeter-Wave Links
This appendix presents an empirical analysis of the impact of weather events
on millimeter-wave links using the data collected over test links.
B.1 Impact on Millimeter-Wave Links
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the weather events on a single
millimeter-wave link.
B.1.1 Eﬀect of Precipitation on FER
The ITU-R P.837 recommendation [92] provides an estimate of the precip-
itation intensities based on year long rain rate statistics for various loca-
tions. However, due to the significant annual variations, accurate modeling
of millimeter-wave links requires precipitation measurements that are time
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correlated to the link test. As mentioned before, we measured rain intensities
at five diﬀerent locations in and around the link span. During our measure-
ments, we recorded precipitation for approximately 1.6% of the time. Figure
B.1 shows the probability distribution of rain rates for the observed events.
The cumulative distribution function for the precipitation is given in Fig-
ure B.2. It is observed that 95% of the overall precipitation had a rain rate
less than 25 mm/hr. The maximum observed rain rate was 160 mm/hr, but
occurs with very low probability. As seen in Figure B.2, rain rates greater
than 60 mm/hr contribute less than 1% towards the overall precipitation.
This understanding of the probability and duration of high-intensity events
is necessary to build eﬀective routing algorithms that are resilient to link
disruptions.
Rain
Figure B.3 shows the variation of eﬀective FER during a heavy precipitation
event for the system with FEC. It is seen that FEC overcomes degradations to
low intensity rain (e.g. below 5 mm/hr). However, for the short-lived, heavy-
intensity rain events, the FER can be as high as one leading to complete link
failures. For the same event, it was observed that the first radio link, lacking
FEC, performed poorly with significant frame errors before and after the rain
event due to the latent moisture in the atmosphere.
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Figure B.2: Cumulative distribution function of recorded weather events
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Figure B.3: FER due to a typical rain event on FEC enabled radio link
Humidity
It is well known that high relative humidity increases the path loss by one
dB/km or more depending on the specific conditions [93]. Figure B.4 shows
variation in humidity as a function of time over a period of five days (03–
08 August 2007), together with the associated FER for first radio link. As
expected, the FER shows a strong correlation to humidity, tracking its diur-
nal characteristic. A relative humidity of over 60% is required to observe a
noticeable change in the FER. As the humidity increases above 60%, FER
increases exponentially. However, an absolute value of 2 × 10−4 FER for
a relative humidity of 90% is still small enough to be overcome by Reed-
Solomon (204,188) FEC, as implemented in second radio in which no losses
were observed.
178
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
08/03
00:00
08/03
12:00
08/04
00:00
08/04
12:00
08/05
00:00
08/05
12:00
08/06
00:00
08/06
12:00
08/07
00:00
08/07
12:00
08/08
00:00
1E-06
1E-05
1E-04
1E-03
1E-02
1E-01
1E+00
re
lat
ive
 h
um
idi
ty
fra
m
e 
er
ro
r r
at
e
time
humidity
FER
Figure B.4: Correlation between humidity and FER
Snow
Figure B.5 shows FER as a function of time for a snow event on 29 January
2008 for first radio link which does not employ FEC. Light to heavy snow
was observed between 10:00 and 14:00 hours. As with humidity, the system
with FEC did not show sensitivity to snow events, while for the link without
FEC the system availability showed significant degradation.
B.1.2 Link Availability Analysis
We show the FER distribution on the two test links in Figure B.6. Note that
these distributions are based on those samples in which FER > 0; in other
words, we calculate the PDF and CDF for non-zero error samples. These
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Figure B.5: FER due to a snow event on Jan 29, 2008
cumulative distribution function of the FER shows that the extremes (low
and high FERs) contribute more in the error distribution. Comparing the
two radios, we see that the CDF of the radio without FEC increases faster
in the low FER region when compared to that of radio with FEC. However,
the CDF shows that the radio with FEC performs significantly better than
its counterpart because the low error rates are well masked by the error
correction codes.
In this section, we evaluate the availability of the millimeter-wave links based
on the data presented above. We define link availability as the percentage of
time that the link has a FER less than a specified threshold. Each sample
of FER is measured over a 40 sec interval transmission as described above.
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These individual samples are then used to determine link availability over
longer time intervals. Availability as a function of FER threshold is given in
Figure B.7. As expected, these results show the benefit of FEC, however, they
also provide an example of the relatively high availability (∼95%) possible
for a millimeter-wave link over a long (8.7 km) span.
The availability presented in Figure B.7 is specific to the radios used in the
experiments. In order to derive a more general measure of link availabil-
ity under weather disruption, we apply the same analysis to the statistical
precipitation data presented in previous section (Section B.1.1). Figure B.8
shows the predicted availability as a function of rain rate tolerable by a given
radio. For example, if the link budget of a given radio can overcome the at-
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Figure B.7: Availability as a function of FER threshold
tenuation caused by rain rate of up to 10 mm/hr, the predicted availability
is 0.9971.
In order to characterize the link from a service perspective, we define three
link states: strong, weak and disconnected; each represents a particular range
of FER. The thresholds chosen roughly correspond to the current industry
standards on the service requirements of cellular backhaul links:
State 1: strongly connected if FER ≤ 5× 10−5;
State 2: weakly connected if 5× 10−5 < FER ≤ 5× 10−2;
State 3: disconnected if 5× 10−2 < FER.
1Rain rate statistics vary depending upon the geographic location.
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Figure B.8: Availability as a function of rain rate threshold
Table B.1: State probabilities over the duration of the experiments
State Radio 1 probability Radio 2 probability
strongly connected 0.3864 0.9469
weakly connected 0.5203 0.0255
disconnected 0.0833 0.0275
The objective is to quantify link state probabilities based on actual observed
weather events (including rain, humidity, and snow) at a given geographical
location. Table B.1 shows the observed state probabilities for the the two
radios.These results were used to drive simulation scenarios for the routing
protocol evaluation in Section C.
This shows that, while the RS(204,188) FEC was suﬃcient to overcome
disruptions due to humidity, snow, and low intensity rain, reliable use of
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millimeter-wave links in the presence of heavy rain warrants the need for
solutions above the physical (radio) and link layers.
B.2 Impact on Mesh Topology
In this section we examine the eﬀects of the previously-mentioned eight rain
storms moving across a MWMN consisting of a 4×4 grid topology, with 16
nodes and 24 links. The individual link lengths are 10 km and the network
spans a region of approximately 1000 km2 representing a metropolitan-area
mesh network. We analyzed the attenuation and BER experienced by all the
links in the network during the duration of the storm. The duration of the
storm is defined as the time diﬀerence between the instance when the first
link is aﬀected by the storm and the instant last link recovers from the storm.
We then characterize the eﬀect of the individual storms on a per-link basis
as well as for the entire network. Finally, we aggregate the results across all
storms to get average statistics.2
B.2.1 Channel Error Rate
As a specific rain event moves across the grid, it aﬀects a number of the links
that are in its path. Individual links suﬀer attenuation to varying degrees
depending upon the geographical distribution of the high-intensity regions
in the storm. The disruptive eﬀect of a given storm on all the MWMN
2Due to space constraints, we show illustrative results for per-storm analysis from a
rain event that was observed on 9 July 2008 in Lawrence, KS, USA
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Figure B.9: Storm eﬀect on link error rates at each time interval
links is presented using a using a scatter plot of each link BER at every
time interval during the storm duration, shown in Figure B.9. The time
interval used for polling was 10 seconds. The plot shows only those links
that suﬀer a BER greater than 1 × 10−7; all other links were error free.
This distribution of BER values indicates that while a number of links were
severely degraded, a significant number were either partially degraded or
remained normal throughout the duration of the event.
B.2.2 Mesh Availability Analysis
As shown in Section B, the sensitivity of the millimeter wave transmission
to precipitation and humidity can be compensated using FEC. Therefore, we
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Figure B.10: Percentage of links in each state for each time interval
calculate the link availability based on the eﬀective BER after the applying
the FEC gain from the Reed Solomon (204,188) code. We then quantize the
eﬀective BER range into three levels representing the state of the links as
normal, partially degraded, and severely degraded. We define normal as the
state in which the eﬀective BER of a link is less than the threshold of 5×10−8.
Links with BER greater than 5 × 10−8 but less than 5 × 10−5 are defined
to be partially degraded. Finally, links with BER greater than the threshold
of 5 × 10−5 are severely degraded. These BER thresholds correspond to the
FER thresholds mentioned previously. Using these thresholds we determine
the percentage of links which fall into a given region and any time during
the rain event as shown in Figure B.10.
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We observe that just before the storm event, 100% of the links in the mesh
are in the normal state (state 1), but as the storm moves over the grid a
number of links begin transitioning to the partially and severely degraded
states. As the storm moves out of the region the links return to the normal
state.
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Appendix C
Mesh Network Performance
In this section, we present the methodology used to model and simulate
the storms used in this study. Furthermore, we present the parameters for
XL-OSPF and P-WARP used in the simulations. Finally, we quantify the
disruptive eﬀect of storms on the MWMN, and compare the disruption tol-
erance of the proposed mechanisms.
C.1 Simulation Setup
We conducted simulations using storm modeling software that we developed
in MATLAB and the ns-2 simulator [94]. The simulated topology consists of
16 nodes connected in a square mesh as shown in Figure C.1. The millimeter-
wave links between each pair of nodes are 10 km long. The nodes remain
fixed at their locations throughout the simulation.
To model a cellular backhaul network, nodes 0 and 15 are connected to the
external network (Internet) and hence all traﬃc passes through one of these
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Figure C.1: Simulation topology
nodes. The remaining 14 nodes generate traﬃc at a rate of 2.4 Mb/s. The
generated traﬃc is CBR over UDP with a packet size of 1000 bytes. We use
eight diﬀerent storms that took place in the Topeka – Lawrence – Kansas
City corridor in 2007 and 2008 to evaluate the disruption tolerance of the
proposed mechanisms. These storms, which are modeled using the proce-
dure described in Section A.3, consist of an outer ellipse (partially degraded)
varying between 30–200 km in diameter and inner ellipses (severely degraded)
with a diameter varying between 5–30 km. We have selected two of these
storms for illustrative purposes in this section. The first of these occurred
30 September 2007 in Lawrence, KS, and the second on 22 April 2008. We
evaluate the packet delivery ratio and the service availability of the network
for four diﬀerent routing mechanisms. .
190
C.2 Simulation Results
We compare the performance of P-WARP and XL-OSPF to a baseline of
conventional OSPF (reactive to link failure but with no radar-data input)
and static routing that provides a worst-case lower bound on performance.
The metrics of interest are packet delivery ratio, delay, and overhead.
C.2.1 Packet Delivery Ratio
The packet delivery ratios averaged over a window of two seconds are shown
in Figures C.2 and C.3 for all four routing protocols. This plot shows the
instantaneous response of the network to the first simulated storm. As the
individual links fail due the storm, the delivery ratio of the network falls
rapidly.
The time taken by the network to recover from link failures depends on the
routing protocol. Static routing, as expected, performs very poorly and we
show it as a lower performance bound reference. OSPF without any modifi-
cation performs better than static because it can sense link outages from the
loss of four consecutive hello packets. However, the delay in detection and
route re-computation results in significant packet loss. XL-OSPF performs
better than static routing and standard OSPF because it can detect degrad-
ing links in a shorter time from the their cost as advertised in the link state
updates. Since the cost metric is directly proportional to the link error rate,
high error paths are avoided whenever possible. P-WARP outperforms all
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Figure C.3: Windowed average of received packets: second storm
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three protocols because it can predict an upcoming link failure from weather
updates and reroutes traﬃc ahead of the disruption.
For example, consider the packet delivery ratios at t = 1400 sec in Figure
C.2. At t = 1420 sec, the storm disrupts additional links (given that the
network is already degraded to 93% PDR) causing severe packet loss in case
of static routing as the PDR drops to 65% and does not recover until the
storm has passed at t = 1800 sec. On the other hand, OSPF detects failed
links and recovers back to the starting PDR at t = 1460 sec, indicating a
40s recovery time that corresponds to the dead interval. XL-OSPF recovers
much more quickly than OSPF and static routing. It takes approximately
10s (at t = 1430) to recover to maximum delivery ratio. Finally, P-WARP
maintains the maximum possible delivery ratio indicating a negative reaction
(predictive) time. Accurately predicting the impending disruption, P-WARP
preemptively routes data on stable paths, thereby avoiding the failed links
completely. The reason the maximum possible delivery ratio is not always one
is that an intense storm cell located directly on top of a node may aﬀect all
the outbound links from a particular node causing all packets sourced from
and destined to that node to be dropped irrespective of the routing protocol
used. The only way to mitigate this eﬀect is to provide alternative paths
from a given node: either a fiber connection to the network when practical,
or a lower-frequency, lower-bandwidth, but less weather susceptible link such
as in the 23 GHz range which also can be used for weather reflectivity data
and WLSU dissemination.
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In order to compare the aggregate performance of the protocols with respect
to each other, the cumulative average of the packet delivery ratio is shown
in Figures C.4 and C.5. The cumulative average of packets delivered by XL-
OSPF is very close to that of P-WARP in each case, and both outperform
conventional OSPF. In the case of XL-OSPF, the frequency of link state
updates determine the reaction time of the network; strict restoration times
would require a very small value of update intervals. Because of its predictive
nature, P-WARP has two distinct advantages: first, it has negative reaction
time that might be necessary if stringent service requirements (such as 50ms
restoration time frequently advertised by network service providers) are to
be met; second, the frequency of weather updates does not scale with the
restoration times leading to lower protocol overhead.
C.2.2 Delay
While the absolute value of the end-to-end delays in the wireless-mesh topol-
ogy are negligible, it is worth noting that P-WARP and XL-OSPF can cause
higher average delays as they routes packets around link outages, while OSPF
and static routing lose more packets during link outages and thus do not in-
cur these delays. Figures C.6 and C.7 show the end-to-end delays averaged
over a two second interval.
We have conducted a number of additional simulations with varying update
intervals for OSPF and XL-OSPF. We have observed that while the general
relationship between the OSPF, XL-OSPF and P-WARP routing remains
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the same, the performance gap between XL-OSPF and P-WARP decreases
with increasing LSA update frequency, as expected.
C.2.3 Overhead
Static routing does not generate any overhead traﬃc. Conventional OSPF
generates periodic hello messages as well as LSAs. However, the frequency
of the LSA does not aﬀect the performance because the quality of the link is
not reflected in the its cost metric. On the other hand, XL-OSPF uses a cost
metric that is proportional to link BER and therefore generates frequent
updates that are flooded in the network. As discussed above, in order to
react quickly to weather disruptions, XL-OSPF must generate LSAs at a
higher rate. This leads to significant increase in the overhead. The number
of updates generated in P-WARP are comparatively lower for two reasons.
First, a single WLSU update carries the predicted costs for all the links.
Hence, individual nodes do not generate link state updates. Second, an
update is generated only when there is a change in the predicted BER of
one or more links. Since, the performance of the P-WARP is not dependent
on the arbitrary update frequency, WLSUs are rate limited to 30 seconds to
bound the overhead.
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